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When a government announces that an existing law will be amended, and 
that the amendment, when finally enacted by the legislature, will be made 
effective from the announcement date, it is natural and inevitable that 
private entities will conduct their activities on the basis of the amended 
law immediately upon the announcement date, notwithstanding the 
announcement’s lack of any formal legal effect.  This practice of effecting 
immediate de facto legal changes is known derisively, but perhaps aptly, 
as “legislation by press release.” This Article utilizes the recent use of 
legislation by press release to implement the Buyer’s Stamp Duty in Hong 
Kong as a case study to critically examine the legality and normative 
considerations of this increasingly common but under-theorized practice.  
Legally, this Article argues that the prospective notice provided by the 
initial announcement ensures the practice’s legality in all but an explicit 
prohibition of retrospective civil legislation.  Normatively, this Article 
highlights the various criteria of clarity, consistency, necessity and 
political dynamic that affect the desirability of the practice.  On a broader 
note, the formal retrospectivity inherent in the practice - but which does 
not disrupt the reliance interests of private entities - provides a useful 




                                                
**Assistant Law Professor (University of Hong Kong), JSD Candidate (University of 
Chicago), LLM (University of Chicago), LLB (University of Singapore). Admitted to the 
bar in New York and Singapore. The author is grateful to Johannes Chan, Albert Chen, 
Richard Cullen, Say Goo, Weixia Gu, Dino Kritsiotis, Ji Lian Yap and the participants of 
the HKU Staff Seminar for insightful critiques and comments, and Loveday Liu and 
Sharon Tam for excellent research assistance. All errors are mine alone. 
2 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    Vol. 10 
 
I.	   INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 3	  
II.	   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: RETROSPECTIVE LAWS AND 
LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE ...................................................... 9	  
A.	   Retrospectivity and Retroactivity ......................................... 9	  
B.	   General Concerns about Retrospective Laws ..................... 13	  
C.	   Legislation by Press Release ............................................... 15	  
III.	  THE CASE STUDY OF HONG KONG’S BSD ................................. 18	  
A.	   Regulating the Vibrant Property Market ............................. 18	  
B.	   The Buyer’s Stamp Duty .................................................... 20	  
C.	   The Protracted Legislative Process ..................................... 21	  
D.	   The Aftermath: Real Effect of the Yet Effective Law ........ 26	  
IV.	  LEGALITY OF LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE ........................ 28	  
A.	   Constitutional Framework in Hong Kong ........................... 29	  
B.	   Retrospectivity .................................................................... 30	  
1.	   Per Se Prohibition of Retrospective Criminal Law ......... 30	  
2.	   Expanded Notion of “Law” and Proportionality ............. 32	  
3.	   Presumption Against Retrospectivity .............................. 34	  
4.	   Previous Examples of Retrospective Laws ...................... 35	  
C.	   Taxing Power ...................................................................... 38	  
D.	   Summary: Legislation by Press Release is Legal ............... 39	  
V.	   TOWARDS BETTER LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE ................ 40	  
A.	   Certainty and Consistency with an Initial Announcement . 40	  
B.	   The Necessity(?) of Legislation by Press Release .............. 42	  
1.	   Changing Nature: Beyond Curative Legislation .............. 43	  
2.	   Justification: Risk of Circumvention? ............................. 46	  
3.	   The Proper Focus of Inquiry ............................................ 49	  
C.	   Implications of Political Dynamic ...................................... 51	  
1.	   Implications of Political Dynamic ................................... 51	  
2.	   Hong Kong’s Fragmented and Antagonistic Political 
Landscape ............................................................................... 54	  
3.	   The Problematic Failed Legislation by Press Release ..... 57	  
VI.	  THE INCONSISTENT HARM OF RETROSPECTIVITY ...................... 60	  
VII.	   CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 64	  
2014]  HONG KONG LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE       3 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Retrospective laws have never failed to capture the attention 
of legal scholars.1  From the early writings of eminent jurists such as 
Blackstone and Hobbes2 to modern journals and books devoted to 
the subject,3 the notion of laws that catch individuals off-guard by 
subsequently changing the legal consequences of past actions has 
always had the capacity to excite discussions thereof.  This copious 
literature has delved into the various aspects of the concept, such as 
the tension between the hostility towards statutory retrospectivity 
versus the more tacit acquiescence of adjudicative retrospectivity,4 
the relationship between retrospectivity and the rule of law,5 the 
distinction between the common law presumption against 
retrospectivity and the presumption against interference with vested 
                                                
1 For a discussion about the various – and at times confusing – definitions of retrospective 
laws and the related concept of retroactive laws, see infra II.A. 
2 For a concise discussion about the historical origin on retrospectively, including the early 
scholarly works, see BEN JURATOWITCH, RETROACTIVITY AND THE COMMON LAW 27-35 
(2008); CHARLES SAMPFORD, RETROSPECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 9-17 (2006).  For 
examples of early treatise devoted to retrospective law, see WILLIAM G. MYER, VESTED 
RIGHTS: SELECTED CASES AND NOTES ON RETROSPECTIVE AND ARBITRARY LEGISLATION 
AFFECTING VESTED RIGHTS OF PROPERTY (1891); WILLIAM PRATT WADE, A TREATISE ON 
THE OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF RETROACTIVE LAWS: AS AFFECTED BY 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS (1880). 
3 E.g., CHARLES SAMPFORD, supra note 2; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2; Ulf Bernitz, 
Retroactive Legislation in a European Perspective – On the Importance of General 
Principles of Law, 2000 INT’L ASPECTS 43 (2000); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal 
Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1997); Andrew Palmer & 
Charles Sampford, Retrospective Legislation in Australia: Looking Back at the 1980s, 22 
FED. L. REV. 217 (1993); John Prebble et al.,, Legislation with Retrospective Effect, with 
Particular Reference to Tax Loopholes and Avoidance, 22 N.Z.U.L. REV. 17 (2006); J. 
Paul Salembier, Understanding Retroactivity: When the Past Just Ain’t What it Used to be, 
33 H. K. L. J. 99 (2003). 
4 See e.g., JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 67-109 & 220-2 (detailed analysis of court’s 
divergence approach towards the two types of retrospectivity, and argued that a more 
uniform and principled approach is desirable); Fisch, supra note 3 (arguing against the 
disparate treatment towards the two types of retrospectivity and for a uniformed approach 
where retrospective laws is permissible if the regulatory context is in flux). 
5 See e.g., MARTIN P. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND RIGHTS 239-62 
(2007) (examining the implication on rule of law arising from the retrospective criminal 
sanctioning of individuals who committed morally reprehensible acts that are formally 
legal in a prior totalitarian regime); SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 257-88 (contextual 
discussion of the various types of retrospective laws and argues that there will be 
circumstances where retrospective laws are both normative desirable and consistent with 
the rule of law properly understood). 
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rights,6 and the compatibility of retrospective laws with general 
constitutional and/or human rights requirements of “in accordance 
with law” or similarly worded provisions.7  
There is a particular type of retrospective law that has 
received relatively scant attention.  Known derisively as “legislation 
by press release,” this practice involves the government announcing 
that an existing law will be amended and that the amendment, when 
finally enacted by the legislature, will be made effective from the 
announcement date.8  The coining of “legislation” is rather apt 
because, notwithstanding the announcement’s lack of any formal 
legal effect, it is natural and inevitable that private entities will 
conduct their activities on the basis of the amended law immediately 
upon the announcement date.  Yet, despite the increasing usage in 
various jurisdictions9 of this potent tool of the executive branch to 
exercise immediate de facto legal influence on the behavior of 
private entities without any legislative authorization, the 
considerations that are applicable in assessing the normative 
desirability of legislation by press release has remained largely 
                                                
6 See e.g., Salembier, supra note 3, at 116-8, 137-8 (arguing for a clear conceptual 
distinction between the two presumptions since, notwithstanding the close relationship 
between the two, each deals with specific and distinct harm). 
7 See e.g., Melvin R.T. Pauwels, Retroactive Tax Legislation in View of Article 1 First 
Protocol ECHR, 2013/6 EC TAX REVIEW 268 (2013) (discussing how European Court of 
Human Rights assess the permissibility of retroactive taxes in light of Article 1 of the First 
Protocol that provides “No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided by law and by the general principles of 
international law.” (emphasis added)).  See also Daniel Deák, Pioneering Decision of the 
Constitutional Court of Hungary to Invoke the Protection of Human Dignity in Tax Matters, 
39 INTERTAX 534 (2011) (discussing the Hungarian Constitutional Court use of the 
“protection of human dignity” to invalidate the retrospectivity of certain confiscatory tax); 
Bernitz, supra note 3, at 51-5 (discussing the requirement of “legal certainty” and 
retrospective law).  See infra IV.B.2. 
8 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 156-7; Terry Hayes & Kirk Wilson, Proposed Amendments to 
Australia’s Anti-Avoidance Laws Cause Business Uncertainty, 23 J. OF INT’L TAXATION 52, 
52 (2012); Joseph Jaconelli, Tax Legislation, Forestalling, and Economic Information, 
2013 PUBLIC LAW 737, 745 (2013); Robert Påhlsson, Retroactivity: Swedish Practice on 
Legislation by Governmental Communication, 39 INTERTAX 271, 271-2 (2011);  Miranda 
Stewart & Kristen Walker, Australia: National Report, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 193, 239 
(2007); Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 235. 
9 In Australia, the use has become prevalent since the late 1970s. Stewart & Walker, supra 
note 8, at 239; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 156. In Canada, see Salembier, supra note 3, at 
107.  In the U.K., see Infobank, Taxation: Legislation by Press Release, 1992(7) BUS. L. R. 
(U.K.) 176, 176-7 (1992).  In Sweden, see Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 274. 
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unexamined.10  In what circumstances, if any at all, can the use of 
legislation by press release be desirable?  
Legislation by press release also poses interesting conceptual 
challenges to the conventional understanding of retrospective laws.  
The retrospectivity of the new law is unquestioned given the explicit 
backdating of legal effect, yet the typical objections to retrospective 
laws that are based on the protection of reliance interests of 
individuals11 are not applicable if the government announcement is 
accompanied by a sufficiently clear and detailed description of the 
new law.  In this regard, does “retrospectivity” still warrant a 
categorical “heightened scrutiny” in legal doctrines such as the 
presumption against retrospectivity 12  and the outright ban of 
retrospective laws,13 or should the inquiry be reoriented towards the 
underlying harms that are commonly associated with but not 
inevitable or exclusive to retrospective laws?  
The recent implementation of the Buyer’s Stamp Duty 
(BSD) in Hong Kong provides an illustrative case study to examine 
these pertinent issues.  On October 27, 2012, the Financial Secretary 
(akin to the Finance Minister) made a sudden announcement that a 
new transaction tax of 15% of a property’s value would be imposed 
on all residential property purchasers who are not permanent 
                                                
10 The most detailed treatment of legislation by press release is by Charles Sampford, see 
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 156-162; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 262-70.  For 
other mentions/discussions, see infra II.C. 
11 JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 44-64; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 77; Fisch, supra note 
3, at 1084-5; Prebble, et al., supra note 3, at 19; Salembier, supra note 3, at 106-7. See 
infra II.B. 
12 JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 67-118; Salembier, supra note 3, at 112-6.  See VICTOR E. 
SCHWARTZ & EVELYN F. ROWE, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 188-92 (LexisNexis 5th ed. 
2010) (discussing U.S. courts’ approach in the specific context of statutory retroactivity in 
comparative negligence rules). 
13 E.g., Hungary: Deák, supra note 7, at 540-1; Sweden: Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 272; 
Bernitz, supra note 3, at 43-7 (finding the constitutional prohibition of retroactive tax and 
fee was added in 1979 to complement the existing prohibition on retroactive criminal law); 
Oman: Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 744. 
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residents of Hong Kong.14  This new tax is a property-cooling 
measure intended to curb the rapid rise in property prices that has 
occurred over the past couple of years.15  The BSD would be 
applicable to all property transactions taking place on or after 
October 28, 2012, one day subsequent to the announcement.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the draft bill giving effect to this new 
tax would only be ready a few months after the announcement16 and 
that the draft bill would continue to languish in the legislature for 
sixteen months before its eventual enactment,17 the effects of this 
yet-to-be-enacted law have been keenly felt by all relevant parties 
since the purported effective date of October 28, 2012.  Demand 
from foreigners—the target of the new tax—dropped 
precipitously.18 Land developers made more conservative bids for 
new land. 19   Lawyers handling property transactions collected 
several billion Hong Kong dollars (HKD) in pending BSDs.20  Most 
significantly, the purported legislative objective of cooling the 
property market was at least partially achieved, with secondary 
                                                
14 Tom Holland, Excluding Mainlanders Won’t Allay Main Property Grievance, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Oct. 29, 2012, at 8. There is no “Hong Kong citizen” in Hong Kong – 
“Permanent Resident” is the highest level of immigration/residency status that can be 
obtained and which enjoyed the most rights and privileges in Hong Kong.  For a concise 
exposition on the various aspects of “citizenship” in Hong Kong, including historical 
evolution, manners of acquisition and legal implications, see  Johannes Chan, Nationality 
and Permanent Residence, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 143 (Johannes Chan 
& C.L. Lim eds., 2011). 
15 Joyce Ng, et. al., Buyers Rush to Beat Surprise Homes Tax, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Oct. 27, 2012, at 1. For a discussion of the property market in Hong Kong, see infra III.A. 
16 Joyce Ng & Sandy Li, C.Y. Snubs City Companies’ Pleas for Tax Exemption, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Dec. 19, 2012, at 1; Joyce Ng, Stamp Duty’s Loophole will not be Closed 
by Bill, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 3, 2012, at 3. 
17 Stamp Duty (Amendment) Ordinance 2014, 18(9) GAZETTE (H.K.), Feb. 28, 2014; Liang 
Yongsi, “Shuangla” shihu le! [“Double Cooling Measures” Finally Passed], SINGTAO 
DAILY, Feb. 23, 2014, at A1. 
18 Sandy Li, SHKP Trims Luxuries at Top End of Town, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 28, 
2012, at 3; Paggie Leung, Home Tax Puts Chill in Mainland Buyers, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST, Nov. 2, 2012, at 1; Peggy Sito, New Buyer’s Hopes Rise with Tax, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Oct. 31, 2012, at 1. 
19 Yvonne Liu, Big Two Developers Cool Their Heels, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 10, 
2013, at 1; Sandy Li, Developer Caution Hangs Over Land Sale Prospects, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Jan. 2, 2013, at 4. 
20 Caiye gaoji: foujue lazhao lougu zheng [Financial Secretary Warning: Vetoing Cooling 
Measures Would Result in Tumor in Property and Stock Market], SINGTAO DAILY, Feb. 22, 
2014, at A4; Lazhao zaoan zhao labu shuyi suikuan jiya [Filibuster of Property Cooling 
Measures Causes Backlog of Several Hundred Millions of Tax], ORIENTAL DAILY NEWS, 
Nov. 27, 2013. The exchange rate of HKD is pegged to the US Dollar at a rate of about 
7.8:1: Y. Y. Kueh & Raymond C. W. Ng, The Interplay of the “China Factor” and US 
Dollar Peg in the Hong Kong Economy, 170 CHINA QUARTERLY 387 (2002). 
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home prices witnessing a modest fall, a reversal of the substantial 
increase over the previous two years.21 
 This Article critically examines this episode of legislation by 
press release to make three main arguments.  The first is a relatively 
narrow but previously unexplored legal issue—namely, that 
regardless of the normative desirability of legislation by press 
release, the practice is legal in Hong Kong.  The constitutional 
prohibition of retrospective laws22 is limited to criminal sanctions 
and is not applicable to a property-transaction tax that is not 
punitive in nature.  More significantly, although the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights has indicated that 
retrospective non-criminal laws may be potentially at risk of 
violating the expanded notion of “law” in the “prescribed by law” 
requirement typically stipulated in human rights documents for 
imposition of legal burdens,23 the detailed specifics of the proposed 
law set out in the initial announcement under a typical legislation by 
press release would have effectively shielded it from this legal 
challenge. 
 The second argument draws on the insight arising from this 
first-ever detailed contextual examination of actual legislation by 
press release to articulate the considerations that affect the 
normative desirability of the practice.  Beyond the relatively 
obvious requirement that the initial announcement must be 
sufficiently clear and consistent with respect to the new legal rules, 
there must also be sufficient justifications for what is essentially a 
short-circuiting of the legislative process.  Reflecting the mixed 
assessment of whether the use of legislation by press release to 
implement the BSD is actually necessary to achieve the policy goal 
of property cooling, 24  the necessary inquiry would first entail 
identifying the purported legislative objectives, before being 
                                                
21 Sandy Li, Curbs Likely to Stay Until Prices Fall, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 21, 
2013, at 1; Peggy Sito & Joyce Ng, Secondary Home Prices Continues Fall on Duties, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 8, 2012, at 2. 
22 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 383, § 12 (H.K).  See infra IV.B. 
23 For a discussion of the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on this issue, see 
Pauwels, supra note 7, at 272; Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 273. For the argument in the 
context of Hong Kong, see Sir Anthony Mason, The Place of Comparative Law in 
Developing the Jurisprudence on the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Hong Kong, 37 
H.K. L. J. 299, 314-5 (2007). See infra IV.B.2. 
24 Infra IV.B.2. 
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followed up by an examination of the incentives created for private 
entities by the policy announcement to predict and assess whether a 
forward shift of the activities targeted by the legal change would 
derail the legislative objectives.  
In addition, given that the main critique of legislation by 
press release is the violation of separation of powers, with the 
executive essentially engaging in a de facto form of law-making,25 
the desirability of legislation by press release is intrinsically linked 
to the underlying political dynamic.  The political dynamic of a 
jurisdiction is the product of the interplay between the formal 
constitutional structure and political competition on the ground.26  
Legislation by press release is most undesirable where a formal 
separation of powers between the executive and legislature is 
combined with an agnostic and divided political landscape.  
Conversely, the various criticisms against legislation by press 
release 27  are largely moot under a Westminster system that 
envisages a close relationship between the executive and the 
legislature, when both are dominated by a single political party.  
 The final argument challenges the conventional aversion 
towards formally retrospective laws and highlights the irrelevancy 
of a law’s formal retrospectivity to the disruption caused to the 
reliance interests of private individuals.  This argument echoes the 
insight provided by the well-established U.S. legal literature on 
“legal transition,”28 but with an additional contribution observing 
how the assumption of stable legal regime that underpins the 
general objections toward retrospective laws is particularly ill-suited 
                                                
25 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160-1; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 264-5. 
26 Infra V.C.1. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, 
Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006) (critically discussing how competition 
between political parties can vary and even at times overshadow the institutional 
competition between the different branches of government); Anthony Kammer, Privatizing 
the Safeguards of Federalism, 29 J.L. & POL. 69 (2013) (examining how political 
coordination between influential private entities can transcend the formal jurisdictional 
boundaries of federalism).  Cf. Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 250, 312-4 (2012) (arguing that for the judicial branch at 
least, formal inter-branch separation of power remains salient even in the context where the 
executive and legislature are of the same political affiliation).      
27 These primarily include uncertainty, especially from the delay in legislative ratification, 
and violation to the separation of powers, see infra II.C. 
28 Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 513-5 
(1986); Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: the Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax 
Revision, 126 U. PENN. L. REV. 47, 47-8 (1977).  See infra VI. 
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for jurisdictions undergoing major political and democratic 
transitions. In these jurisdictions—which are more the norm than 
the exception around the globe today—stability in the maintenance 
of the prior regime is neither expected nor desired.  
 This Article is organized into seven Parts.  Part II explores 
the existing literature to present the theoretical framework 
governing retrospective laws and legislation by press release.  Part 
III examines the implementation of the BSD in Hong Kong—in 
particular, the twists and turns in the protracted legislative process 
and the real effect of the announcement in shaping the behaviors of 
the relevant parties.  Part IV addresses the legality of legislation by 
press release with respect to the legal doctrines of retrospectivity, 
“in accordance with law” and taxing powers.  Part V analyzes the 
factors relevant to assessing whether the employment of legislation 
by press release is normatively justified.  Part VI discusses the 
broader implications on the understanding of retrospective laws.  
Part VII concludes. 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: RETROSPECTIVE LAWS AND 
LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE 
This Part initiates the discussion by first addressing 
definitional issues surrounding retrospective laws before reviewing 
the existing literature on the normative considerations surrounding 






A. Retrospectivity and Retroactivity  
A discussion of retrospective laws naturally should begin 
with the definition of “retrospective,” especially in comparison with 
the similar and related concept of “retroactivity.”  Despite numerous 
attempts to provide a conclusive working definition, both terms 
have been used to denote different meanings by different scholars.29  
                                                
29 For a general discussion about the confusing and conflicting use of the term, see 
JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 6-17; Salembier, supra note 3, at 104-7.  See also 
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The fact that the two terms are commonly cross-referenced in the 
dictionary30 only serves to aggravate the confusion, especially in 
non-legal discourse (i.e., political and public debate).  The general 
consensus reflected in modern literature is that “retroactive law” is a 
narrower—and, often, normatively more problematic—conceptual 
subset of “retrospective law,”31 although some scholars have begun 
to advocate abolishing the formal distinction between the two.32  
 
Beyond this broad consensus, the precise content of the 
definition remains unsettled.  For example, Ben Juratowitch’s 2008 
book on “retroactivity” and English common law proposed 
restricting “retroactive” laws to mean only laws that “apply to a past 
event as though it was applicable at the time of the event”,33 such as 
“[a] law entering into force on Wednesday making it an offence to 
have parked on High Street from the preceding Monday onwards.”34  
This usage is to be contrasted with the broader concept of 
“retrospective” laws, which include not only “retroactive” laws but 
also laws that have inter-temporal effects, such as how a law 
prospectively banning parking might affect a long-term parking 
permit.35  By contrast, Charles Sampford, in his book on the broader 
concept of “retrospectivity,” defined “retrospective” laws “as laws 
which alter the future legal consequences of past actions and events 
because the legal texts that will be applied to determine the legal 
consequences of an action at a hearing in the future are not same as 
the texts that were discoverable at the time the action 
commenced.”36  This definition appears similar to Juratwotich’s 
definition of “retroactivity,”37 even if Sampford appeared to agree 
                                                                                                           
SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 9-17 (providing a historical perspective on the development of 
the concept of retrospectivity). 
30 Salembier, supra note 3, at 105. 
31 E.g., Pauwels, supra note 7, at 270-2; Hans Gribnau, Equality, Legal Certainty and Tax 
Legislation in the Netherlands, 9(2) UTRECHT L. REV. 52, 71 (2013); Påhlsson, supra note 
8, at 272; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 9-12, 17; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 17; 
Salembier, supra note 3, at 102-6. 
32 E.g., SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 17-23; Prebble et al.,, supra note 3, at 24-9.  The 
tendency to dispense the distinction most pronounce in the predominantly U.S. legal 
literature on “legal transition.”  See infra VI. 
33 JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 17. 
34 Id. at 5. 
35 Id. at 9-12. 
36 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 37.  
37 Ben Juratowitch considered, and disagreed with, Sampford’s position in the debate as 
simply that the distinction between retrospective and retroactive is immaterial since the 
effect of both is the same.  JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 11-2.  
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that “retroactive” should “refer to retrospective laws whose 
retrospective effect is formally and explicitly stated by indicating 
that an enactment is to take effect before its promulgation.”38  The 
journal article by John Prebble, Rebecca Prebble and Catherine 
Vidler Smith similarly presented an illustrative example of the 
difficulty in defining the concept of “retrospectivity.” In their article, 
they began by explicitly adopting the definition that “[r]etropsective 
legislation can be seen as altering the direct legal consequences of 
past events or statuses,”39 then distinguished this definition by also 
stating that “[r]etrospective legislation can be seen as altering the 
future legal consequences of past events” (i.e., the difference 
between “direct” and “future”),40 and finally emphasized that the 
definition used in their article “addresses both legislation that is 
clearly retrospective in that in applies to dates before its 
commencement and legislation that is not explicitly retrospective 
but that affects pre-existing rights and expectations.”41 
 
Part of the reason for the confusion is due to the different 
context in which the definition and/or distinction is formulated. In 
jurisdictions where “retroactive” laws—but not “retrospective” 
laws—are constitutionally prohibited, the definition of “retroactive” 
must be given a clearly defined and narrow meaning to mitigate the 
dire legal significance that flows from it.42  Unsurprisingly, the 
distinction is less material in jurisdictions where there is no outright 
prohibition against “retroactive” laws, such as under EU law, for 
which the European Court of Human Rights has employed both 
terms interchangeably.43   In English common law jurisdictions, 
where the issue of the “presumption against retrospectivity” in 
statutory interpretation is at stake, the inquiry inevitably focuses on 
“retrospectivity” to the neglect of “retroactivity.”44  Alternatively, in 
                                                
38 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 17. 
39 Prebble, et. al., supra note 3, at 20. 
40 Id. at 24. 
41 Id. at 25. 
42 See Deák, supra note 7, at 540-1 (“A tax law that provides during the tax year 
subsequently for the taxation of the income derived during the year cannot be considered 
as retroactive [and is instead permissible retrospective legislation]  . . .  because the process 
of earning income under taxation has not yet been closed by a tax return to be filed 
following the year in which the taxable income is derived.”).  See also Påhlsson, supra 
note 8, at 272 (discussing Swedish constitutional prohibition on retroactive tax legislation). 
43 Pauwels, supra note 7, at 270. 
44 Salembier, supra note 3, at 112-6. For a detailed discussion on the presumption, see 
JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 67-118. 
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the U.S., where the rule is known as the presumption against 
statutory “retroactivity,” the conceptual distinction of “primary 
retroactivity” and “secondary retroactivity” enjoyed considerable—
if ultimately temporary—usage in the literature.45    
 
In Hong Kong, an English common law jurisdiction, 46 the 
salience of the common law doctrine of the “presumption against 
retrospectivity” most likely explains why “retrospective” is 
commonly employed to describe laws that are otherwise clearly 
“retroactive.”  For example, in the context of drafting a law that was 
going to be expressly backdated, questions were raised in the 
legislative process about existing laws that have “retrospective 
effects.”47  This concern prompted the administration to produce a 
list of legislation where the stipulated effective dates preceded the 
date of enactment/amendment.48  This usage of “retrospective” is 
perpetuated by legal professionals, with the Law Society of Hong 
Kong raising, in the same context, the “question of the 
constitutionality of making the [law] retrospective.”49 
 
                                                
45 See Fisch, supra note 3, at 1067-9 (discussing and rejecting the conceptual dichotomy).  
In Germany, the distinction is between “real” retroactivity and “apparent” retroactivity: 
Georg Nolte & Peter Radler, German Public Law Cases in 1996/97, in 3 EUR. PUB. L. 489, 
495 (1997). 
46 Johannes Chan, The Judiciary, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 289, 289 
(Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011). 
47 E.g., Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, Responses 
to Follow-up Actions Arising from Discussion at the Meeting on 9 February 2011, 
Summary of Views Submitted by Organizations/Individuals on the Stamp Duty 
(Amendment)(No.2) Bill 2010, Legislative Council, CB(1) 1689/10-11(04) (2010) 
(H.K.).  See also Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 7443, 
7550-7553 (Jun, 14, 2000) (H.K.) (discussing the retrospective effect of the 
Family Status Discrimination (Amendment) Bill in 2000). 
48 Summary of Views Submitted by Organizations/Individuals on the Stamp Duty 
(Amendment) (No.2) Bill 2010, Legislative Council, CB(1) 1689/10-11(04), at 18 
(2010) (H.K.). 
48 The Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 
47; Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee,  Responses to 
Follow-up Actions Arising from Discussion at the Meetings on 17 and 21 
December 2010 (Part II), Legislative Council, CB(1)1125/10-11(01), at 2 (2011) 
(H.K.). 
49  Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, Summary of 
Views Submitted by Organizations/Individuals on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) 
(No. 2) Bill 2010, Legislative Council, CB(1) 1698/10-11(04), at 18 (2010) (H.K.).  
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For the purpose of this Article, the precise nuances of the 
definitional distinction between “retrospective” and “retroactive” 
are immaterial because legislation by press releases would clearly 
satisfy even the narrower category of “retroactive” laws, given the 
explicit backdating of the effective statutory date.  This Article 
utilizes the term “retrospective” partly to synchronize with the usage 
in Hong Kong and partly to reflect this Article’s inclination that 
addressing the broader concept of “retrospectivity” is normatively 
more meaningful than trying to carve out a separate conceptual 
category of “retroactivity.”50  
 
B. General Concerns about Retrospective Laws 
Regardless of the precise definition and understanding of 
“retrospective”/“retroactive” laws, it is indisputable that such laws 
are generally viewed with great hostility.  Charles Sampford 
candidly observed that “[n]othing is more certain to cause 
apoplectic explosions of fear and loathing among some lawyers than 
the mere mention of the dreaded word ‘retrospectivity.’”51  This 
homage to the negative image of retrospective laws is typically the 
starting point, especially common in academic literature that has 
sought—perhaps somewhat ironically—to present a more nuanced 
approach towards retrospectivity.52  Even in the absence of explicit 
legal prohibition of retrospective laws, retrospectivity is often a 
                                                
50 See notes and text accompanying Infra VI. Cf., (stray signal?) while Juratowitch argues 
the opposite (that “intertemporal effects of “retrospectivity” are meaningfully different to 
retroactivity – so different as to demand separate categorization”), his discussions about the 
various rationales for the presumption against “retroactivity” (such as certainty, negative 
liberty, fair warning and defeasiblity) is equally applicable to “retrospectivity.”  See 
JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 12 & 43-65.  
51 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 1. 
52 The central thesis of Charles Sampford’s book is that while the importance of the 
reliance interest weighs generally against retrospective laws, this factor is neither 
overwhelming nor unequivocal and the same reliance interest may be used to justify 
retrospective law. SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 7.  For other examples, see JURATOWITCH, 
supra note 2 (examining the circumstances in which the presumption against 
retrospectivity may be justifiably rebutted); Pauwels, supra note 7 (discussing without 
strong criticism the European Court of Human Rights ambivalent and context sensitive 
treatment of retrospective laws); Prebble et. al., supra note 3 (arguing that retrospective 
laws are neither illegal or unconstitutional under New Zealand law, and are at times 
justified).  Cf. PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE TYRANNY OF GOOD 
INTENTIONS 67-8 (2000) (arguing that retrospective laws, including those imposing 
monetary losses from civil liability, are plainly undesirable). 
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cause for concern, especially in statutory law.  The common law 
doctrine of the presumption against retrospectivity in statutory 
interpretation is precisely intended to compel the legislature to 
directly confront the issue of retrospectivity. 53   In Australia, 
retrospectivity in the legislation bill is routinely grounds for 
objection by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of 
Bills, the committee in the upper house of the bicameral 
parliamentary system that is responsible for vetting legislation.54  In 
the Netherlands, a memorandum setting out guidelines limiting the 
use of retrospective statues was issued by the government in 
response to “serious concerns” by Parliament.55  Similarly, in Hong 
Kong, retrospectivity—especially for explicit legislative 
backdating—invites scrutiny occasionally.56 
 
The central theme of the various objections to retrospective 
laws is people’s reliance on the law as a guide for their conduct.57  
Closely connected to the notion of the rule of law,58 the normative 
principle is that private individuals should be able determine the 
legal consequences of their intended activities and arrange their 
affairs accordingly.  Given their nature of being subsequently 
created legal rules that seek to alter the legal consequences of past 
actions, retrospective laws run afoul of this normative principle 
because private individuals cannot possibly be “guided” by laws 
that do not yet exist.59  This situation also gives rise to possible 
                                                
53 JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 68-71; Salembier, supra note 3, at 112-8. 
54 CHARLES SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160-2; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 268; 
Stewart & Walker, supra note 8, at 239-40.  For a discussion of the Australian Senate’s 
role and power in Australian legislative process, see PATRICK KEYZER, PRINCIPLES OF 
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52-53 (2010); Stewart & Walker, supra note 8, at 204-
7. 
55 Gribnau, supra note 31, at 71-2. 
56 See notes and text accompanying infra IV.B.4. 
57 GOLDING, supra note 5, at 246; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 44-64; SAMPFORD, supra 
note 2, at 77; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1084-5; Prebble, et. al., supra note 3, at 19; Salembier, 
supra note 3, at 106-7. 
58 For a discussion about relationship between rule of law and retrospective law, see 
GOLDING, supra note 5, at 240-52; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 77-98; Gribnau, supra note 
31, at 53. 
59 GOLDING, supra note 5, at 250; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 44-64; SAMPFORD, supra 
note 2, at 77; Bernitz, supra note 3, at 43; Pauwels, supra note 7, at 268; Prebble, Prebble 
& Smith, supra note 3, at 19; Salembier, supra note 3, at 106-7. 
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injustice when the individuals’ expectations in relation to the legal 
consequences of their actions are disrupted.60  
 
Other ancillary objections to retrospective laws include 
arguments based on democracy and certainty.  The democracy 
objection charges that a government exceeds the temporal limits on 
the government mandate when it enacts retrospective laws 
overriding decisions of a previous government.61  Nonetheless, the 
objection would apply neither to situations in which the prior 
government is not democratic nor to retrospective legislation whose 
backdating effects still fall within the tenure of the enacting the 
government—as is typical of legislation by press release.62 The 
certainty objection is related both to the rule of law considerations 
regarding reliance on laws for guidance and to the economic 
considerations regarding the distortion of incentives to invest.63  
Under this argument, the permissible use of retrospective laws 
generates uncertainty for individuals attempting to plan their 
activities, leading to the dilution of the guidance function of the 
existing laws and underinvestment on account of these uncertainties.  
On the economic considerations front, scholars in the United States 
employing economic analysis have argued that the uncertainty 
generated by expressly retrospective laws is no less than that of 
nominally prospective laws that affect activities of a substantial time 
horizon,64 whereas Louis Kaplow further argued that there is no real 
difference between uncertainties due to legal change and 
uncertainties due to ordinary market fluctuation.65 
 
C. Legislation by Press Release 
                                                
60 GOLDING, supra note 5, at 251; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 45; ROBERTS & STRATTON, 
supra note 52, at 67-8; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 87-95; Gribnau, supra note 31, at 70-1. 
61 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 68-70; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1121; Palmer & Sampford, 
supra note 3, at 225-6; Prebble et al., supra note 3, at 46-7. 
62 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 71-2; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 225-6. 
63; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 48-9; ROBERTS & STRATTON, supra note 52, at 75-6; 
Gribnau, supra note 31, at 70-1; Kaplow, supra note 28, at 522-32. 
64 Fisch, supra note 3, at 1089-91; Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and 
Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L. J. 1015, 1016, 1022-3 (2006); DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN 
RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND 
RETROACTIVITY 16-32 (2000). 
65 Kaplow, supra note 28, at 533-6.  For critical analysis of this view, see SAMPFORD, supra 
note 2, at 238-40. 
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The BSD, notwithstanding the undeniably explicit 
retrospective effect, is distinct from conventional retrospective laws.  
The effective date of the implementation, while being set at a date 
prior to the enactment, is only backdated to the date in which there 
was an express public announcement by the government declaring 
its implementation.  This practice of “legislation by press release” 
mitigates the reservations of retrospective laws while introducing 
new concerns.  Given the central theme of protecting the rational 
and legitimate expectations underpinning the objections to 
retrospective laws, the public statement by the government 
announcing—prospectively, no less—changes to the law ensures 
that private individuals will not be caught off guard by the 
subsequent legal changes that will be retrospectively applied to the 
date of the announcement.66  As Charles Sampford stated, “no 
reasonable person would rely on a law remaining the same when the 
Minister has specifically said that it will be changed.”67   
 
However, this advance notice comes at a price.  There are 
two new objections that apply specifically to legislation by press 
release that are not applicable to other retrospective laws.  The first 
is uncertainty in relation to the government announcement.68  Given 
the typical scenario in which the draft bill will not be ready for 
presentation at the time of announcement, there is likely going to be 
uncertainty as to the precise details of the final legislation. 69  
Moreover, excessive delay 70  and the possibility of subsequent 
amendments to the draft bill will further complicate any attempted 
prediction.  This situation may not always be undesirable, especially 
in the context of tax legislation for which legislation by press 
release is most commonly used.  Seeking out loopholes through a 
literalist interpretation of the tax law is neither a legitimate 
expectation to be protected nor a desirable behavior to be 
encouraged.71  This objection is also resolved if the announcement 
is made sufficiently clear.72 
                                                
66 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 263; Pauwels, 
supra note 7, at 278. 
67 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157. 
68 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 158-9; Hayes & Wilson, supra note 8, at 52. 
69 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 158; Hayes & Wilson, supra note 8, at 53. 
70 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 161-2; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 268. 
71 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 159; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 267-8.  See also Ji 
Lian Yap, De Facto Directors and Corporate Directorships, 2012 J. BUS. L. 579, 586-7 
(2012) (observing how the ambiguity in the current legal definition of de facto director 
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The other concern with legislation by press release is the de 
facto exercise of legislative power by the executive branch in light 
of how the announcement substantially shapes the behaviors of 
private individuals as if it were a duly enacted law.73  Although the 
legislature still technically has the final say as to whether the law 
should be enacted, such practice “places the Parliament in the 
invidious position of either agreeing to the legislation without 
significant amendment or bearing the odium of overturning 
arrangements which many people may have made in reliance on the 
Ministerial announcement.”74  
  
Commentators in various jurisdictions have observed the 
increasingly prevalent use of such a legislative “mechanism.”75  One 
key reason is the ability of legislation by press release to effect de 
facto legal changes immediately, which is especially necessary in 
situations in which private entities can circumvent the policy 
objective by shifting forward activities that would otherwise be 
affected by the announced change in law.76  Another likely reason is 
that, when retrospective legislation is expedient or necessary,77 the 
provision of an announcement helps mitigate the political pressure 
and/or public backlash that might otherwise be generated by the use 
of retrospective laws.  Indeed, in Hong Kong, the government has 
expressly relied on public notification through policy announcement 
when defending legislative amendments that are to be backdated.78  
Likewise, in Sweden, an exception to the general prohibition of 
                                                                                                           
under U.K. company law is arguably necessary to preserve the doctrine’s usefulness in 
order to impose liability on a director on those who acted as such while avoiding a formal 
title).  Cf. Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX. L. 
REV. 489, 493 (2011) (discussing the perverse incentives under strategic tax law 
uncertainty that can thwart the objective of reducing tax evasion). 
72 Pauwels, supra note 7, at 278. 
73 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160-1; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 264-5. 
74 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160 (quoting the Senate Standing Committee for the 
Scrutiny of Bills). 
75 In Australia, the use of these legislative mechanisms has been prevalent since the late 
1970s. Stewart & Walker, supra note 8, at 239; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 156. In Canada, 
see Salembier, supra note 3, at 107.  In the U.K., see Infobank, supra note 9, at 176-7.  In 
Sweden, see Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 274. 
76 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1089; Palmer & Sampford, 
supra note 3, at 264. See also Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 738-40 (discussing the problem of 
“forestalling” by private entities in response to knowledge of pending tax).  See infra V.B.2. 
77 Cf. notes and text accompanying infra V.B.1. 
78 Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 49, at 18. 
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retroactive tax legislation is carved out for what is essentially 
legislation by press release.79  
 
III. THE CASE STUDY OF HONG KONG’S BSD 
Having examined the relevant theoretical framework, this 
part turns to the recent implementation of the BSD in Hong Kong as 
a case study for examining in detail the legal and normative 
considerations of legislation by press release.   
 
A. Regulating the Vibrant Property Market 
Property is a source of wealth in Hong Kong, an autonomous 
jurisdiction under the sovereignty of China since its handover from 
British colonial rule in 1997.80  With over seven million people 
packed into an economically vibrant jurisdiction of a mere 1104 
square kilometers,81 real estate is not regarded merely as places for 
residential or commercial purposes but as a vehicle for investment 
and speculation.82  Property booms and busts have dotted the recent 
history of Hong Kong.83  Although the government is not oblivious 
to the threat posed by property speculation on the stability of 
financial institutions and the affordability of housing, 84  past 
measures to regulate excessive property speculation have typically 
focused on restrictions on financing85 and the direct provision of 
                                                
79 Tax legislation can be retrospective to the date in which the “government issues a 
communication to Parliament.” Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 272; Bernitz, supra note 3, at 47 
(emphasis in the original). 
80 Johannes Chan, From Colony to Special Administrative Region, in LAW OF THE HONG 
KONG CONSTITUTION 3, 28-9 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011). 
81  Hong Kong 2012: The Facts, available at 
http://www.yearbook.gov.hk/2012/en/pdf/Facts.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2014). 
82 Indeed, local academic Lawrence Law opined that rights to land is treated as merely a 
commodity in Hong Kong, subjected to compensation for the sake of building of more new 
urban space, but without due regard to the landowner’s negative right to not use the land 
for profit or the aspect of land as a genuine public good.  Lawrence W. C. Lai, A Model of 
Planning by Contract: Integrating Comprehensive State Planning, Freedom of Contract, 
Public Participation and Fidelity, 81 TOWN PLANNING REV. 647, 667 (2010). 
83 Kueh & Ng, supra note 20, at 392. 
84 Berry F.C. Hsu, Asset Quality in HKSAR’s Real Estate Markets: A Public Policy and 
Legal Analysis, 19 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 263, 269-70 (2002). 
85 Kueh & Ng, supra note 20, at 392. 
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subsidized public housing. 86  The Hong Kong government has 
previously avoided the use of direct taxation on property and 
property transactions as a regulatory tool (as opposed to revenue 
generation), reflecting the low-tax policies rooted in colonial times 
and later enshrined in the Basic Law87 as well as the “free market” 
ideology ostensibly advocated by the Hong Kong Government.88  
The high prices and high transaction volume driven by speculation 
also arguably create a perverse incentive for the government to 
acquiesce to such a practice in the context where land sales and 
other land-associated revenues are dominant sources of government 
revenue.89  
 
The first use of property tax to regulate the property market 
occurred in 2010.  The property market, after a temporary setback 
due to the 2008 financial crisis, had begun a rapid ascent due to a 
potent mix of external factors that included the low interest rate 
supported by U.S. quantitative easing, the flood of foreign capital 
seeking safe havens, and the involuntary depreciation of the HK 
currency, which remains pegged to the U.S. dollar.90  In November 
2010, the government implemented the Special Stamp Duty 
(“SSD”), a transaction tax of up to 15% of the property value if a 
residential property is sold within a stipulated period after 
acquisition. 91   This anti-speculation tax, together with other 
                                                
86 Lai, supra note 82, at 665; Louis Augustin-Jean, Urban Planning in Hong Kong and 
Integration with the Pearl River Delta: A Historical Account of Local Development, 62 
GEOJOURNAL 1, 4 (2005). 
87 Richard Cullen et al., Fiscal Policy and Financial System, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG 
CONSTITUTION 321, 340 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011); Hsu, supra note 84, at 
268. 
88 ELIZA W.Y. LEE ET AL., PUBLIC POLICYMAKING IN HONG KONG: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND 
STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN A SEMI-DEMOCRACY 77-8 ( 2013); Augustin-Jean, supra note 
86, at 4; Hsu, supra note 84, at 264. 
89 Lai, supra note 82, at 665; C. Y. Jim, Planning Strategies to Overcome Constraints on 
Greenspace Provision in Urban Hong Kong, in 73(2) THE TOWN PLANNING REVIEW 127, 
146 (2002); Hsu, supra note 84, at 269. 
90 Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 3319, 3442 (Dec. 8, 2010) (H.K.); 
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 2463, 2541-2 (Nov. 24, 2010) (H.K.).  
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 3319, 3442 (Dec. 8, 2010) (H.K.); 
Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 2463, 2541-2 (Nov. 24, 2010) (H.K.); 
see generally Kueh & Ng, supra note 20 (discussing the impact of the U.S. dollar peg on 
the different aspects of the Hong Kong economy). 
91 Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 3319, 3440-2 (Dec. 8, 2010) 
(H.K.); Dennis Eng et al., Property Speculators Slapped with up to 15pc Extra Stamp Duty, 
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 20, 2010, at 1. See also Stamp Duty Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 
117, § 29CA (H.K.) (presenting the finalized version of ordinance).  
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measures targeting property financing,92 failed to stem the rapid rise 
in property prices93 or to placate the increasingly vocal public 
discontent over housing affordability.94   This situation led to the 
enhancement in the SSD and the imposition of the BSD two years 
later.  
B. The Buyer’s Stamp Duty 
At 6 p.m. on October 27, 2012, Financial Secretary John 
Tsang Chun-Wah made a sudden and unexpected announcement 
regarding the introduction of two tax measures to cool the property 
market.95  First, a new BSD of 15% of the property value would be 
imposed on all residential property purchases by entities that were 
not Hong Kong permanent residents.  Second, the existing SSD 
would be enhanced in terms of the maximum rate payable (by five 
percentage points) and the applicable duration (by one year).96  The 
measures would be effective from midnight on the date of the 
announcement, leaving a mere window of six hours between the 
announcement and the measures’ implementation.97  
 
 The BSD is a potent form of taxation that is regarded by 
market watchers as tough.98  The Financial Secretary described the 
taxes as “extraordinary measures under exceptional 
circumstances”99 to “prevent even further exuberance in the housing 
market” and to “accord priority to [Hong Kong permanent resident] 
                                                
92 See, e.g., Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 9037, 9157-8 (Apr. 13, 
2011) (H.K.); Eng, et al., supra note 91 (noting that the Monetary Authority reduced the 
maximum allowable loan to value ratio and required banks to conduct more stringent stress 
tests).  
93 Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 9037, 9157-8 (Apr. 13, 2011) 
(H.K.) (observing that despite the SSD reducing the number of short-term speculative 
activities measured in terms of confirmed transactions, property prices have not declined). 
94 Thousands Join in Property Price Protest in Hong Kong, W. MORNING NEWS (U.K.), 
July 2, 2011, at 14. 
95 Ng et al., supra note 15. 
96 Holland, supra note 14. 
97 Ng et al., supra note 15. 
98 Id.; see also Transport and Housing Bureau, The Administration’s Response to the Issues 
Raised at the Meeting of the Bills Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 
Held on 25 January 2013, Jan. 29, 2013, LC Paper No: CB(1) 511/12-13(02), Annex C at 
8-10 (setting out the overseas experiences in relation to the purchase of residential 
properties by non-locals and noting that Singapore was the first jurisdiction to introduce 
property transactions that specifically target non-residents in December 2011, with Macau 
following Hong Kong’s implementations  just a few days thereafter). 
99 Ng et al., supra note 15. 
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buyers over [non-Hong Kong permanent resident] buyers.” 100  
Indeed, property purchases by non-permanent residents had 
increased from 5.7% of new-home purchases in 2008 to 19.5% in 
2011.101  There was also arguably a political motivation to pander to 
the anti-mainland sentiment, 102  with the increasing presence of 
Chinese mainlanders in the Hong Kong property market, who 
accounted for 42.3% of the purchases of new homes worth HKD 12 
million or more in the preceding quarter.103  
 
 The announcement of these tax measures sparked a frantic 
flurry of activity by developers and purchasers seeking to avoid the 
tax before midnight.  The launch of a major residential project was 
swiftly brought forward in one day to meet the onrushing scramble 
of purchasers, with 100 flats sold by 10 p.m.—a mere four hours 
after the announcement.104  Similar moves were made by other 
developers as well.105  Mainland purchasers were also reportedly 
rushing from the neighboring Chinese city of Shenzhen to beat the 
deadline. 106   This surge in last-minute property purchases was 
followed by a subsequent plunge in transactions arising from the 
decrease in buyers’ interest (especially non-residents) and the 
withdrawal of units by sellers in anticipation of a fall in price.107  
 
C. The Protracted Legislative Process 
After the initial excitement (or agitation) subsided, the focus 
of the inquiry shifted to the details of the measures.  This curious 
outcome was the result of not only the absence of effective 
legislation to accompany the announcement of the tax measures on 
                                                
100 Transport and Housing Bureau, Legislative Council Brief: Further Measures to Address 
the Overheated Property Market, Oct. 26, 2012, at 3. 
101 Joyce Ng, et al., Non-locals Hit with New Property Tax, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 
27, 2012, at 1.  See also Sandy Li & Peggy Sito, New Levy will Reduce Sales and Prices, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 27, 2012, at 3 (noting that companies accounted for 9.7% of 
home sales in the first three quarters of 2012). 
102  Johnny Tam & Tony Cheung, Levy May Hit Genuine Residents Too, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Oct. 28, 2012, at 3 (citing political analyst James Sung Lap-kung as 
supporting this proposition). 
103 Li & Sito, supra note 101. 
104 Yvonne Lou, et al.,, Buyers in Midnight Dash for Yuen Long Flats, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST, Oct. 27, 2012, at 3. 
105 Id. 
106 Ng et al., supra note 15. 
107 Leung, supra note 18; Sito, supra note 18. 
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October 27, 2012, but also the lack of a draft bill.  Indeed, the 
preparation of the draft bill—the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 
2012 [the Bill]—only began after the announcement and was 
completed two months thereafter.108  The government did upload, in 
conjunction with the initial announcement, an admirably detailed 
FAQ outlining the specifics and illustrative examples of the pending 
legislation on the Inland Revenue Department website. 109  
Nevertheless, the FAQ attracted a fair amount of scrutiny on the 
purported ambiguity of certain provisions.110  
 
In light of the ongoing legislative process, it is not surprising 
that interest groups and their corresponding legislators were actively 
lobbying for all sorts of variations.  Many of the efforts were 
directed at diluting the effect of the BSD through the creation of 
additional exemptions.  From the outset, there was a push for an 
exemption for companies that were owned by permanent 
residents.111  The Real Estate Developers Association, a powerful 
interest group that represents the interests of developers, sent an 
open letter to the government requesting an exemption of luxury 
flats of more than HKD30 million, 112  and later requested an 
exemption for local companies 113  and then for small local 
companies with no more than five shareholders. 114   Abraham 
Razack, a functional group legislator representing the real estate and 
construction sectors,115 similarly expressed vocal opposition to the 
                                                
108 Ng & Li, supra note 16; Ng, supra note 16. 
109 See BUYER’S STAMP DUTY (BSD), http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/faq/bsd.htm (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2013) (providing answers to various question that may arise regarding the Buyer’s 
Stamp Duty). 
110 See, e.g., Transport and Housing Bureau, The Administration’s Response to the Issues 
Raised at the Meeting of the Bills Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 
Held on 18 February 2013, Apr., 2013, LC Paper No: CB(1) 893/12-13(02) at 24-7 
(stating the Hong Kong Association of Banks’ suggestion that the FAQ provision in 
relation to the conveyance to a financial institution to a mortgage is consistent with the 
provision on the bill). 
111 Ng & Li, supra note 16; Simpson Cheung, Developer Calls for New Look at Property 
Taxes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 9, 2012, at 5. 
112 Peggy Sito & Ng Kang-chung, Developers Want Luxury Flats to be Exempt from Tax, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 24, 2012, at 3 (discussing the statements of officials of the 
Real Estate Developers Association that government intervention in the property market 
was unhealthy and harmful to the reputation among international investors). 
113 Ng & Li, supra note 16. 
114 Joyce Ng, Call to Leave Local-owned Companies out of 15pc Tax, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST (HK), Feb. 1, 2013, at 1. 
115 Under the institutional design of the Hong Kong legislature, there are group of members 
who are elected from a defined electorate that is typically based on profession or industry. 
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measure in its entirety 116  before insisting on a local company 
exemption. 117   There was also lobbying for the exemption of 
purchases by charitable organizations.118  The real-estate sector even 
sought support from populist legislators known for their anti-
government rhetoric.119  The government persistently resisted such 
amendments due to potential circumvention and exploitation of 
loopholes.120 
 
 There was lobbying in the opposite direction as well.  A 
lawmaker, Kenneth Leung, proposed amendments to impose a 
domicile requirement—in addition to the existing permanent 
resident requirement—for exemption from the BSD. 121   The 
administration rejected such a requirement based on the 
administrative difficulties in evaluating the context-sensitive issues 
of domicile.122  Some lawmakers also suggested excluding from the 
BSD exemption Hong Kong permanent residents who were minors 
                                                                                                           
See generally Lam Wai-man, Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Legislative Council – Where 
Politics Matters More than Size, in LEGISLATURES OF SMALL STATES: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 137, 141-2 (Nicholas D. J. Baldwin ed.,  2013); Albert Chen, Development of 
Representative Government, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 215, 243 
(Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds.,  2011). For more analysis on the political infrastructure 
and dynamic in Hong Kong, see infra V.C.2.  
116 Luisa Tam, Home Truth, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 5, 2012, at 48. 
117 Sandy Li, New Property Taxes Still in Limbo, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 9, 2013, at 
1. 
118 Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Issues Raised at the 
Meetings of the Bills Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 8 July 
2013, July 8, 2013, LC Paper No: CB(1) 1618/12-13(02) at 1; Li, supra note 117; Ng 
Kang-chung, Cooling Measures ‘Unfair to Locals’, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sep. 17, 
2013, at 5. 
119 Ng Kang-chung, Property Sector Turns to Radicals in Tax Fight, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST, Sep. 16, 2013, at 4. 
120 See Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Issues Raised at 
the Meetings of the Bills Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 16 
September 2013, Sep. 16, 2013, LC Paper No: CB(1) 1843/12-13(02) at 1-3 (rejecting the 
argument that companies owned by Hong Kong permanent residents should be exempted 
from the Buyer’s Stamp Duty because these exemptions would create loopholes, which 
would require significant changes to the current tax system to eliminate); Transport and 
Housing Bureau, supra note 118 (discussing the difficulties that would arise in determining 
the actual use of a property if charitable organizations were exempted from the Buyer’s 
Stamp Duty). 
121 Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Draft Committee 
Stage Amendments Proposed by the Hon Kenneth Leung, Nov. 2013, LC Paper No: CB(1) 
337/13-14(01) at 1. 
122 Id. 
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but whose parents were not Hong Kong permanent residents.123  
This proposal was again rejected due to concerns of discriminatory 
effects against the targeted Hong Kong permanent residents that 
might infringe on the right to equality.124  Nonetheless, a follow-up 
recommendation to exclude all permanent residents who were 
minors was eventually taken up by the government in January 
2014. 125   This proposal did raise concerns about whether this 
withdrawal of the exemption should be retrospectively applied to 
the date of announcement given the substantial departure from the 
initial announcement. 126   The government insisted on full 
retrospective effect based on the purported concerns of 
circumvention and narrowly survived an attempted amendment that 
would have rendered this withdrawal prospective.127 
 
Two other significant but politically less salient changes 
were made to the final legislation as a result of the legislative 
process.  The first change related to the exemption for 
redevelopment, wherein the government indicated in its 
announcement that purchases of property by developers for the 
purpose of redevelopment would be exempted from the BSD.128  
The proposed six-year limitation under the Bill was dropped in 
favor of requiring demonstrable evidence of redevelopment for a 
refund of the BSD—a change that would potentially allow for a 
                                                
123 Transport and Housing Bureau, The Administration’s Response to the Issues Raised at 
the Meetings of the Bills Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 15 
October 2013, Oct. 2013, LC Paper No: CB(1) 133/13-14(2) at 2. 
124 Id. 
125 Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Committee Stage 
Amendment Proposed by the Hon Regina IP, Jan., 2014, LC Paper No: CB(1) 623/13-
14(04) at 1-2. Stamp Duty Ordinance, §§ 29CB(8)(b), 29CB(9)(b), 29DB(9)(b) & 
29DB(10)(b), supra note 91 (excluding minors from the category of persons exempted 
from the Buyer’s Stamp Duty by eliminating the term “minor” from the statutory 
language); Stamp Duty (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 2, (2014), §§ 10 & 13 (eliminating 
the term minor from the Stamp Duty Ordinance); Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill, (2012) 
§§ 9 & 12 (replacing previous statutory language with new provisions excluding minors 
from the category of persons exempted from the Buyer’s Stamp Duty). 
126 Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council 7302 (Feb. 19, 2014) (H.K.). 
127 Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 – Committee Stage – Hon Dennis Kwok’s 2nd 
Amendment to Clause 17, Feb. 21, 2014, Vote 13 (passing by a margin of one vote among 
the 27 Functional Legislative Council members and 24 Geographical Legislative Council 
members). 
128 Ng & Li, supra note 16; Yvonne Liu, Sino Land Plans Unaffected by Cooling Measures, 
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 1, 2012, at 1. 
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speedier refund process.129  The second change concerned the scope 
of exemptions for a non-Hong Kong permanent resident who 
purchased a replacement property after the resident’s initial 
residential property was involuntarily sold.130  The exemption was 
expanded to cover a broader spectrum of circumstances after the 
government accepted the submissions of the Law Society of Hong 
Kong.131  
  
Delay in the legislative process – in part due to an unrelated 
filibuster by opposition lawmakers, but mainly due to a lack of 
agreement among the legislators on the substantive rules – resulted 
in the Bill being stuck in the legislative process for fifteen months 
following the announcement of the tax measures. 132   The 
government’s intense lobbying and political jostling among the 
political parties in the legislature culminated in extended three-day 
marathon sessions for the second and third readings of the relevant 
bill that had commentators raving with speculation about the 
prospect of the Bill’s passage.133  Indeed, as the scheduled date for 
the second and third readings of the Bill drew closer, a final issue 
emerged as the dominant political talking point—namely, the 
provision that would empower the Financial Secretary to make any 
future changes to the rates of the BSD and SSD by unilateral 
announcement in the Gazette without the need for additional 
                                                
129  See Stamp Duty Ordinance, § 29DD, supra note 91; Stamp Duty (Amendment) 
Ordinance 2014, § 13, supra note 125; Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012, § 12, supra 
note 125. 
130 Transport and Housing Bureau, The Administration’s Response to the Issues Raised at 
the Meeting of the Bills Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 20 
May 2013 and the Submission from the Law Society of Hong Kong of 28 May 2013, May 
28CB(1) 1288/12-13(01), 98 (June, 2013) at 1-4. 
131 Id.; Stamp Duty Ordinance, §§ 29CB (4) & 29DB(5), supra note 91; Stamp Duty 
(Amendment) Ordinance 2014, §§ 10 & 13, supra note 125; Stamp Duty (Amendment) 
Bill 2012 §§ 9 & 12, supra note 125 (expanding the Buyer’s Stamp Duty to include 
acquisitions made under the Mass Transit Railway (Land Resumption and Related 
Provisions) Ordinance, Roads (Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance, Railways 
Ordinance, Land Acquisitions (Possessory Title) Ordinance, and the Land Drainage 
Ordinance) (H.K.).  
132 See Li, supra note 117, at 1; Yongsi, supra note 17, at A1; Filibuster of Property 
Cooling Measures Causes Backlog of Several Hundred Millions of Tax, supra note 20. 
133 See Shuanglazhao xiuding nan guoguan [Amendment of Double Cooling Measures 
Unlikely to Pass], H.K. ECON. J., Feb. 11, 2014, at A1; Zhang Weiwei, “Shuangla” erdu, 
gangfu jianjue “chuangguan” [Second Reading of “Double Cooling Measures” – 
Government Insistence to Push Ahead], SINGTAO DAILY, Feb. 19, 2014, at A8.  
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legislative authorization.134  This empowerment provision attracted 
allegations of “administrative tyranny” and threats to veto the entire 
Bill by certain political parties.135  The government attempted to 
placate the objections with a last minute “oral undertaking” to still 
consult the legislature for upward revisions of rates,136 which only 
served to generate even more controversy.137  Ultimately, the Bill 
with the three changes to the exemptions of redevelopment, 
replacement and Hong Kong permanent residents minors discussed 
above, was passed on February 22, 2014, and was registered in the 
Gazette (becoming law) on February 28, 2014.138 
D. The Aftermath: Real Effect of the Yet Effective Law 
Despite the BSD amendment languishing in the legislative 
process for more than a year after the announcement, the impact of 
the measures was keenly and immediately felt by all relevant parties 
from the announcement date.  First, lawyers handling property 
transactions began collecting these pending taxes for eventual 
possible payment to the government.139  This move resulted in funds 
                                                
134 Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012, § 16 (H.K.). Under the current administrative law 
framework, the Legislative Council will be presented with the subsidiary legislation (the 
definition of which includes notice to change the rates) at the earliest opportunity and may 
amend or repeal the subsidiary legislation by resolution).  See Interpretation and General 
Clauses Ordinance, § 34, c. 1 (1997) (H.K.).  
135 See Yinhua shui xiuding yiyuan chang xian shenyi hou dingli [Amendment to Stamp 
Duty – LegCo Member Urges Legislative Review Before Implementation], H.K. ECON. J., 
Feb. 5, 2014, at A10; Amendment of Double Cooling Measures Unlikely to Pass, supra 
note 133. 
136 Zhang, supra note 133, at A8. 
137 The real controversy surrounding the “oral undertaking” is more political than the 
purported concerns for rule of law and/or separation of power.  The oral undertaking was 
given in response to the legislators from the pro-establishment political parties, which 
infuriated the rival pan-democrats political parties over the perceived preferential treatment 
by the government to the pro-establishment camp.  The pan-democrats threatened to block 
the Bill in its entirety, but ultimately chose to boycott the vote (which effectively facilitate 
the passage) given the strong popular support for the Bill.  See Fanmin lichang cucheng 
yi’an guoguan zhengfu chanshen [Bill Passed With Absence of Pan-Democrats – A Pyrrhic 
Victory for the Government], H. K. ECON. J., Feb. 24, 2014, at A4; Liang, supra note 17. 
For discussion of the antagonistic political landscape in Hong Kong, see infra IV.C.2.  
138 Stamp Duty (Amendment) Ordinance 2014, supra note 17.  See also Liang, supra note 
17, at A1.  
139  See Filibuster of Property Cooling Measures Causes Backlog of Several Hundred 
Millions of Tax, supra note 20; Li, supra note 117, at 1.  
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amounting to several billion HKD being held up in the client 
accounts of these law firms.140  
 
Other private actors similarly modified their behavior in 
response to the pending law. Some developers offered discounts 
designed to partially or completely offset the pending increase in the 
tax burden. 141   Other developers increased the commission to 
property agents to help push the inventory.142  New land sales 
understandably saw more conservative bids.143  Developers also 
changed the designs of new projects—such as reducing the number 
of “super luxury” features—in anticipation of the dampened interest 
by cash-rich foreign buyers.144  Redevelopment plans by private 
developers were derailed by the increase in upfront acquisition cost 
and the reduction in output demand.  Moreover, investment shifted 
to industrial and commercial properties, which would not be 
affected by the BSD and SSD.145 
 
Foreign buyers explored measures for avoiding the taxes, 
such as purchasing property via share transfers (if the property was 
owned by a company), although there were additional transaction 
costs to verify the account and liability of the property-holding 
company.146  This practice was also adopted by some developers for 
their remaining unsold apartments.147  There was also a shift in 
                                                
140 Id.; See Financial Secretary Warning: Vetoing Cooling Measures Would Result in 
Tumor in Property and Stock Market, supra note 20, at A4. 
141 See Kenneth Ko, Sweet Deals, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 1, 2013, at 1.  See also 
Leung, supra note 18 (offering 15% discount for remaining flats); Sandy Li, Rivalry Fuels 
Fears over Price Cuts, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 12, 2013, at 1 (offering discount of 
50% of BSD). 
142 See Peggy Sito, Tax Takes Huge Toll on Sales, S. SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 
21, 2012, at 1 (increasing commission to 5% from the previous 1-2.5%).  
143 See Liu, supra note 19, at 1, 4. 
144 See Li, supra note 18, at 4. 
145 See Shu-ching Jean Chen, Leung Firm on Reining in HK Property Prices, BUS. TIMES, 
Dec. 7, 2012; Peggy Sito, Boom in Factory Space Investors, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 
30, 2013, at 1.  Jimmy Chow, Chang of Pace, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 18, 2013, at 
14 (noting that while an exemption would be granted for redevelopment that is completed 
within 6 years upon acquisition, it is in the form of a refund, meaning that a substantial 
amount of capital will be locked up).  
146 See Joyce Ng & Sandy Li, Curb on Avoiding New Flat Still Leaves Tax Dodges, S. 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 1, 2012, at 3.  
147 See Yishou haozhai chaizhao bi qianwan yinghua sui [Avoidance of Tens of Millions of 
Stamp Duty Via Countermeasures In First Hand Sales of Luxury Property], MINGPAO 
(H.K.), Oct. 30, 2012. 
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investment to industrial and commercial properties, which were not 
affected by the BSD and SSD.148  
 
Overall, the “yet to be implemented” BSD and SSD proved 
effective in cooling the property market.  The previous trend of 
rising prices on secondary homes was halted amidst a substantial 
decline in transaction volume.149  
 
IV. LEGALITY OF LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE  
One interesting observation from the case study on the BSD 
is the absence of any qualms about the legality of how the measures 
were implemented.150  There was some discussion about the legality 
of the substantive content of the BSD: Tom Holland opined that the 
BSD might be discriminatory and infringe on the Basic Law Article 
105’s right of freedom to acquire, use and dispose of property;151 
Abraham Razack suggested a possible violation of equality 
protection;152 and the Hong Kong Conveyancing & Property Law 
Association Limited argued that the BSD restricted the policy of 
free trade and contravened articles 105, 106 and 115 of the Basic 
Law.153 Beyond the legality of the substantive aspects,154 the issue 
of retrospectivity has largely been ignored in the discussion of the 
BSD.  Interestingly, the Law Society did raise the “question of the 
constitutionality of making the SSD legislation retrospective” 
                                                
148 Shu-ching Jean Chen, Leung Firm on Reining in HK Property Prices, BUS. TIMES 
(Sing.), Dec. 7, 2012; Peggy Sito, Boom in Factory Space Investors, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST, Jan. 30, 2013, at 1. 
149 See Li, supra note 21; Sito & Ng, supra note 21.  Property agents were particularly 
hard-hit by the substantial fall in property transactions, with several public protests 
organized by affected property agents.  See Peggy Sito, Realty Strikes, S.SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST, July 5, 2013, at 4.  
150 Official Reports of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 12561-12564 (June 22, 2011) 
(H.K.).  During the 2011 legislative debate over the SSD, Dr. Margaret Ng did mount a 
substantial objection over the retrospective nature of the SSD implementation.  
Nonetheless, the objection was based on normative policy considerations (delay and 
uncertainty) rather than on legal grounds.  
151 Tom Holland, Four More Ways Officials Break the Spirit of HK’s Basic Law, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Nov. 23, 2012, at 12.  
152 Ng, supra note 118, at 5. 
153 Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 110, at 16.  
154 It is worth noting that, notwithstanding the alleged severity of the legal critique 
surrounding the BSD, there has been no indication or suggestion of litigation.   
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during the SSD debate in 2011, but there was no further elaboration 
or argument beyond that passing comment.155  
 
This Part critically examines the legality of the manner in 
which the BSD was implemented as follows: first, by setting out the 
constitutional framework in Hong Kong; second, by analyzing the 
issue of retrospectivity, including a discussion of previous examples 
of retrospective laws in Hong Kong; and third, by examining the 
ancillary issue of the power to tax. The conclusion is that legislation 
by press release is legally permissible in Hong Kong.       
A. Constitutional Framework in Hong Kong 
The starting point for assessing legality is the constitutional 
documents of a jurisdiction that set forth fundamental rights.  In 
Hong Kong, there are actually three possibly relevant instruments.  
The first is the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s de facto constitution after 
the handover from British colonial rule to China in 1997.156  The 
second is the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, enacted in 1991 
to incorporate the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”) into Hong Kong157 after the Tiananmen Square 
incident in China sparked concerns about future human rights 
protections after the handover.158  The third instrument is the ICCPR, 
which “as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force” under article 
39 of the Basic Law.159  The precise relationship between these 
three instruments is a complicated and, at times, controversial issue 
for courts determining the substantive content of constitutional 
rights or assessing the legality of restrictions on rights.160  As a 
general matter, either the Basic Law or the Hong Kong Bill of 
                                                
155 Law Society of Hong Kong, Preliminary Submissions by the Law Society’s Property 
Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010, CB(1) 983/10-11(01), at 9 
(2011). 
156 Chan, supra note 80, at 28-29.  
157 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, supra note 22.  
158 See Dinusha Panditaratne, Basic Law, Hong Kong Bill of Rights and the ICCPR, in LAW 
OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 425, 431-2 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011); 
Carole J. Petersen, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Hong Kong: A Case for the 
Strategic Use of Human Rights Treaties and the International Reporting Process, 14 
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 28, 42-6 (2013). 
159 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 39 (H.K.).  
160  For a concise overview and analysis of this issue, see PETER WESLEY-SMITH, 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG 319-27 (2d ed. 1994); 
Panditaratne, supra note 158, at 436-60. 
30 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    Vol. 10 
 
Rights Ordinance will suffice in providing grounds for a 
constitutional challenge,161 whereas the ICCPR may serve as a 
constraint against repeal or amendment of the Hong Kong Bill of 
Rights Ordinance without itself providing an independent source of 
enforceable rights.162 
 
B. Retrospectivity  
1. Per Se Prohibition of Retrospective Criminal Law  
The relevant provision concerning retrospective law is 
contained in article 12 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.  
A direct replica of article 15 of the ICCPR, the provision is titled 
“No retrospective criminal offences or penalties” and stipulates that:  
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of 
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, 
under Hong Kong or international law, at the time when it was 
committed.  Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one 
that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was 
committed.163 
 
This right against retrospective criminal offenses or penalties 
has no counterpart in the Basic Law,164 but as noted in the preceding 
section, this fact is no obstacle to the courts in striking down 
retrospective punitive legislative provisions.165  
The protection from retrospective laws is, however, limited only to 
criminal sanctions, as is clear from a plain reading of article 12 of 
                                                
161 See Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim, Interpreting Constitutional Rights and Permissible 
Restrictions, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 465, 470-1 (Johannes Chan & C.L. 
Lim eds., 2011); Panditaratne, supra note 158, at 441-4; Simon N. M. Young, Restricting 
Basic Law Rights in Hong Kong, 34 H.K. L. J. 109, 115-7 (2004). 
162 See Panditaratne, supra note 158, at 441-2, 456-60; Young, supra note 161, at 115-7. 
163 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, supra note 22. 
164 See XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 24-42 (H.K.).  
165 E.g., Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 H.K.C.F.A.R. 315, 350-2 
(C.F.A.) (challenging an amendment to the Immigration Ordinance that imposes a new 
requirement of an administrative certificate for the exercise of the right of abode by certain 
classes of permanent residents, thereby rendering persons without such certificate liable for 
immigration – i.e. criminal – offences).  See also R v. Chan Suen Hay, [1995] H.K.L.Y. 
205 (D.C.) (relying on article 12(1) of the Bills of Rights Ordinance to disallow an 
application for a disqualification order under a Companies Ordinance provision that was 
enacted six years after the commission of the offense).   
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the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (or, for that matter, the 
international human right standards set forth in the ICCPR).  
Inevitably, there is ambiguity and uncertainty on the margins as to 
what constitutes a “criminal offense” or “penalty.” In Hong Kong, 
the higher appellate courts have not had the opportunity to pass 
judgment on this issue.166  Two lower courts have done so, though 
their decisions are somewhat inconsistent.  The first is a High Court 
decision that found the disqualification of a driver’s license upon 
the accumulation of certain traffic demerit points to be a mere civil 
consequence of a criminal offence and thus did not constitute 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes (i.e., Article 11(6) Hong 
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance).167  The other is a subsequent 
District Court decision, which held that a director disqualification 
order under the Companies Ordinance is a penalty that cannot be 
imposed if the triggering criminal offense was committed before the 
enactment of the relevant Companies Ordinance provision.168   
 
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights and U.S. 
courts have grappled with difficult cases such as whether 
confiscation of property from convicted drug traffickers, mandatory 
sex offender registration, indefinite civil confinement for 
“dangerous” sex offenders, and other legal sanctions violate the ban 
on retrospective criminal laws. 169   Nonetheless, the general 
consensus among various jurisdictions is that taxation per se does 
not fall within the ambit of such a ban.170  
                                                
166 In the Ng Ka Ling case, neither party disputed that immigration offences would fall 
within the prohibition on retrospective criminal laws, and the main was whether the 
offending provision would be struck down in its entirety or interpreted to simply prohibit 
retrospective prosecution.  See Ng Ka Ling, supra note 165, at 350-2. 
167 The Queen v. Wan Kit-man, [1992] 1 H.K.C.L.R. 225 (H.C.).  
168 Chan Suen Hay, supra note 165 (distinguishing the Wan Kit-man case on the basis that 
the disqualification order is discretionary, not automatic). 
169  The short answers are, respectively, yes (European Court of Human Rights); no 
(European Court of Human Rights and U.S. Supreme Court); and no (U.S. Supreme Court).  
See SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 135-41.  For a detailed exposition on EU jurisprudence on 
article 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which is similar to article 15 of the 
ICCPR, see DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
331-339 (2nd ed. 2009); ROBIN C A WHITE & CLARE OVERY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 296-304 (5th ed. 2010). 
170 See generally SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 151-6 (discussing the cases from various 
jurisdictions); Fisch, supra note 3, at 1066; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 261 (“Tax 
is not a penalty for earning income, nor is there any social disapproval attaching to the fact 
that a demand for unpaid taxes has been made.”); Pauwels, supra note 7, at 272-3. 
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2. Expanded Notion of “Law” and Proportionality 
 Notwithstanding the lack of per se prohibition against 
retrospective civil legislation, such legislation may still be 
scrutinized by the courts under judicial review of general 
constitutionality.  In Hong Kong,171 as similarly articulated in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 172  and 
Canadian courts,173 legislation must conform to both the principles 
of legality and the requirement of proportionality.  The principle of 
legality arises from “prescribed by law” and similar phrases that 
commonly precondition any imposition of legal burdens (including 
taxes) on private entities.  Courts have increasingly infused a 
qualitative requirement when interpreting what constitutes “law.”  
The European Court of Human Rights construed the term “law” to 
require “qualitative requirements, including those of accessibility 
and foreseeability.”174  A similar approach has been adopted in 
Hong Kong as well.175  While more typically used to critically 
evaluate regulatory/legislative schemes that accord broad 
discretionary power to government officials,176 this requirement of 
accessibility and foreseeability provides a potential avenue for 
courts to examine retrospective civil legislation in the absence of an 
express constitutional prohibition.  Sir Anthony Mason, a non-
permanent Judge of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal and 
former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, opined in his 
academic writing on the possibility for a greater operation of the 
general principle of legality under the ICCPR in challenges to 
                                                
171 See Chan & Lim, supra note 161, at 487-95.  
172 See A. W. BRADLEY & K. D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 681-2 
(15th ed. 2011); WHITE & OVERY, supra note 169, at 312-5, 325-32, 478; ALEX CARROLL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 398-400 (5th ed. 2009); STEVEN GREER, THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
201-13 (2006).  For a critical discussion of the legal theory imbedded in these two concepts, 
see GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 17-36, 99-119 (2007).  
173 See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 797-803, 828-829 (Student ed., 
5th ed. 2007); Barb Billingsley, Justification, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, 
COMMENTARY AND PRINCIPLES 837, 837-60 (Leonard I. Rotman ed., 2008). 
174 See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 169, at 334; WHITE & OVERY, supra note 169, at 312-5; 
Bernitz, supra note 3, at 51-2.  
175 See Chan & Lim, supra note 161, at 488-9.  See also Lo v. H.K.S.A.R., [2012] 15 
H.K.C.F.A.R. 16, 42-4 (C.F.A.); Shum Kwok Sher v. H.K.S.A.R., [2002] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 
793, 810-2 (C.F.A.) (applying this approach).  
176 See HOGG, supra note 173; WHITE & OVERY, supra note 169, at 314-5; Chan & Lim, 
supra note 161, at 488-9.  
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retrospective laws.177  Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights 
occasionally scrutinizes retroactive tax legislation with respect to 
whether it is a “lawful” interference.178 
  
Alternatively, the use of retrospectivity may be a factor that 
weighs against the principle of proportionality.  This view is 
similarly reflected by the European Court of Human Rights 
involving retrospective tax legislation.179  For example, in M.A. v 
Finland, the court held that the key issue is whether “the 
retrospective application of the law imposed an unreasonable 
burden on [the applicants] and thereby failed to strike a fair balance 
between the various interests involved.”180  Significantly, in R.Sz. v. 
Hungary, the hardship caused to private individuals who were likely 
to exhaust financial resources that are subsequently subjected to 
retrospective taxation was an aggravating factor, in addition to the 
magnitude of the tax, in the court’s finding that the tax was not 
reasonably proportionate.181   
 
Nonetheless, the prospective notice setting out the specifics 
of the pending retrospective laws under legislation by press release 
is likely to substantially meet these two legal requirements.  
Although private individuals may not be able to access laws that 
have yet to be passed and thus are unable to foresee the legal 
consequences imposed by future retrospective legislation, the same 
cannot be said when the private individuals are forewarned by the 
initial announcement.  For the BSD, private individuals were able to 
refer to the detailed implementation guidelines uploaded on the 
                                                
177 See Mason, supra note 23, at 314-5.  Earlier, Judge Mason had entrenched this 
expanded notion of “law” in Shum Kwok Sher v. H.K.S.A.R., a Court of Final Appeal case. 
Shum Kwok Sher v. H.K.S.A.R., supra note 175 at 810-2.  
178 See Bernitz, supra note 3, at 50-2; Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 273; Pauwels, supra note 7, 
at 272.  See also Nolte & Radler, supra note 45, at 495 (noting how under German 
constitutional court jurisprudence, laws which affect transactions that have been concluded 
“are usually impermissible because they violate the principle of legal certainty, which is an 
aspect . . . of the general principle of the rule of law”). 
179 See Pauwels, supra note 7, at 276-9 (discussing the relevant cases).  See also Gribnau, 
supra note 31, at 71 (arguing that retrospectivity, while generally undesirable, can be 
countervailed by competing interests); Nolte & Radler, supra note 45, at 495 (discussing 
the treatment of retrospectivity in assessing proportionality by the German Constitutional 
Court). 
180 M.A. v. Finland, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 712 (2003). 
181  R.Sz. v. Hungary, No. 41838/11, para. 59 (2013), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
121958#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-121958%22]}. 
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government website182 and could not claim surprise at the eventual 
tax bill, especially given that they would have been amply informed 
of the pending tax by property agents and the lawyer handling the 
conveyance.  Similarly, by minimizing the disruption of the reliance 
interests of private individuals, the announcement served as an 
effective counterweight to the adverse effect of retrospectivity on 
the proportionality balancing test.183  In this regard, it is worth 
noting that, in M.A. v Finland, where the retrospective application 
of the tax legislation had no difficulty passing the proportionality 
assessment, the court found it significant that the retrospective 
effect was only backdated to the introduction of the bill.184 
3. Presumption Against Retrospectivity 
 Although the presumption against retrospectivity is not 
strictly a legal prohibition capable of striking down the law, it is 
worth mentioning for completeness that civil legislation will 
nevertheless be subjected to this well-established common law 
principle in statutory interpretation.185  The presumption has been 
invoked several times in Hong Kong courts186 and is also reflected 
in the statutory provision on the interpretation of statutory repeal.187  
Nonetheless, it is not strictly applicable to legislation by press 
release because its retrospective effects will typically be expressly 
and clearly stipulated. Indeed, the preamble188 and the first clause189 
                                                
182 See BUYER’S STAMP DUTY (BSD), http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/faq/bsd.htm (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2013) (providing a  detailed FAQ about the BSD on the website of the Inland 
Revenue Department that sets out the specifics of the legislation to accompany the policy 
announcement). 
183 Pauwels, supra note 7, at 278.  
184 M.A., supra note 180, at 12. 
185 JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 68-71; Salembier, supra note 3, at 112-8. 
186 E.g., Lee Bing Chueng v. Sec’y for Justice, [2013] H.K.E.C. 255, 145-6, 155 (C.F.I.) 
(upholding the presumption of retrospectivity partly because the plaintiff did not challenge 
the concept); The Queen v. Lam Wan-kow [1992] 1 H.K.C.L.R. 272, 277 (C.A.) 
(observing that there is a long established principle against presuming retrospective 
operation of law unless such law indicates it should be applied retrospectively); Comm’r of 
Inland Revenue v. Chan Tin-chu, [1965] D.C.L.R 289, 301 (D.C.) (noting that despite a 
presumption against retrospectivity, a law can have retrospective force if it is clearly stated 
within the statute). 
187 Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, §23, supra note 134. 
188 Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012, pt. 1, cl. 1 (H.K.) (“[T]o impose buyer’s stamp 
duty on certain agreements for sale and conveyances on sale of residential property 
executed on or after 27 October 2012”). 
189 Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012, pt. 1, cl. 1(2) (H.K.) (“This Ordinance is deemed 
to have come into operation on 27 October 2012”). 
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of the bill implementing the BSD could not have been more explicit 
about the intended retrospective operation of the amendment.  
4. Previous Examples of Retrospective Laws 
Given the general legality of retrospective non-criminal laws 
in Hong Kong, it is not surprising that there has not been any 
systematic study of the quantity and characteristics of retrospective 
laws in Hong Kong.190  This section provides a brief descriptive 
overview of some previous examples of retrospective laws in Hong 
Kong.  These examples are not meant to be comprehensive, 
although they are significant, given that all of these examples were 
provided by the government in response to recent queries by 
legislators on the issue of retrospectivity.  The examination of these 
examples not only provides a more circumspect context in which to 
examine Hong Kong’s utilization of legislation by press release in 
particular and retrospective laws in general, but also helps us 
appreciate the significant departure posed by the BSD that will be 
discussed in V.B.  
 
Although retrospectivity was not raised in the BSD, the issue 
was raised in the initial implementation of the SSD in 2010.  The 
Law Society of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Association of 
Banks opposed the retrospective effect of the amendment. 191  
Pursuant to a meeting on February 9, 2011, in which the question of 
“existing ordinances other than revenue ordinances which had 
retrospective effect” was raised, the Bills Committee responsible for 
the stamp duty amendment responded with two examples: the 
Societies Ordinance in 1988 and the Bankruptcy Ordinance in 
2005.192  The latter is uncontroversial—a mere example of adaptive 
amendments to update the reference of government officials and 
                                                
190 Cf., SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 104-64 (providing a study on retrospective laws 
primarily in Australia, but also  the U.S. and U.K.); Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3 
(analyzing retrospectivity in Australian law). 
191 Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 49, at 18.  See 
also Dr Margaret Ng’s speech in the LegCo debate: Official Reports of Proceedings, 
Legislative Council), 12365, 12561-4, June 22, 2011) (H.K.) (criticizing the retrospective 
aspects of the SSD). 
192 Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 47. 
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procedure to account for the handover in 1997.193  The former, 
despite being deemed to have come into operation approximately 
ten years earlier, is also relatively routine because it merely gave 
effect to a legislative amendment of a different piece of legislation 
(Companies Ordinance) from ten years earlier, which, due to a 
drafting oversight, had not been correspondingly reflected in the 
Societies Ordinance.194   
 
The examples of the Societies Ordinance and the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance were in addition to the prior list of existing 
revenue ordinances that had retrospective effects.195  Essentially, 
there were the amendments to the Inland Revenue Ordinance in 
1987 and 1992.  The 1987 amendment concerned the inclusion of 
consideration in exchange for the right to receive income from 
property as a taxable trading receipt,196 but did not attract any 
discussion of retrospectivity notwithstanding the three-month lapse 
between the policy announcement and its eventual enactment.197  
The 1992 amendment involved the closing of two tax-avoidance 
mechanisms—namely, expenditures on intellectual property rights, 
and leveraged leasing of ships and aircraft.198  It did give rise to a 
discussion of retrospectivity, wherein the government agreed to 
exempt “small ticket leasing” from retrospective application of the 
law because the earlier announcement statement did not clearly spell 
out its application to “small ticket leasing.”199  
                                                
193  Id. See Bankruptcy Ordinance, c. 6 (1997) Cap. 6, §§ 1, 12, 19 & 32 (H.K.) 
(demonstrating adaptive amendments to update the reference of government officials and 
procedure to account for the handover in 1997). 
194 The Companies Ordinance was amended to permitted large partnership to engage in 
professional services such as lawyers and accountants, but without the corresponding 
amendment to the Societies Ordinance, those would be still illegal:  Official Record of 
Proceedings, Legislative Council of Hong Kong, 1753, 1783-5 (July 6, 1988) (H.K.).  See 
also Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council of Hong Kong, 1931, 1982-3 
(July 20, 1988) (H.K.) (discussing the implication of how the “legalization,” while 
retrospectively applied to ten years ago, did not affect litigation that has already 
commenced). 
195 Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 48, at 2. 
196 Inland Revenue Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 112, §15A (2012) (HK). 
197 Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 1659, 1675-6. (May. 27, 1987) 
(H.K.). 
198 Inland Revenue Ordinance, §16E, 22B & 39E, supra note 196. 
199  Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, (Mar. 11, 1992) (H.K.) 
(considering the easing of planes and ships “big ticket leasing”, while noting “small ticket 
leasing” typically involves machineries and equipment that are of considerably less 
monetary value). 
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Interestingly, a more extensive list was provided in the 
course of the debate about the retrospective nature of the Family 
Status Discrimination (Amendment) Bill in 2000, in which the 
amendment designed to clarify the original legislative intent (i.e., 
that the selective offering of benefits to immediate family members 
of employees is not illegal, contrary to some legal opinions) was 
made to be retrospective to the date of the original legislation, 
though without affecting existing litigation.200  In addition to the 
Societies Ordinance amendment in 1988 and the Inland Revenue 
Ordinance amendment in 1992, the list also included the 
Immigration Ordinance amendment in 1991, the Land Tribunal 
Ordinance amendment in 1995 and the Employees’ Compensation 
Ordinance amendment in 2000.201 
 
The Lands Tribunal Ordinance amendment resembles the 
Family Status (Discrimination) Ordinance insofar as the amendment 
was made to clarify a clause—here being the jurisdiction of the 
Lands Tribunal over orders for vacant possession on termination of 
tenancies—and passed without any concern about its retrospective 
application. 202   Similarly, the new provision § 13D(5) in the 
Immigration Ordinance amendment was made to remove any doubt 
as to the legal authority of the Director of Immigration to transfer 
Vietnamese detainees between detention centers, though without 
affecting legal proceedings that had already begun.203 
 
The Employees’ Compensation Ordinance is uncontroversial.  
Resembling the drafting oversight that drove the amendment to the 
Societies Ordinance in 1988, the definition of “gale warning” and 
                                                
200 Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 7550-3, (June 14, 2010) (H.K.).  
See generally Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, (2013) Cap. 527 (H.K.) (making 
discrimination on the basis of family status unlawful). 
201 C M Wong, Family Status Discrimination (Amendment) Bill 2000, May 16, 2000, LC 
Paper No: CB(2) 2015/99-00(01). 
202 Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council of Hong Kong, (Nov. 29, 1995) 
(H.K.); Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, (Nov. 2, 1995) (H.K.) (noting 
the amendment was meant to reverse a 1993 Court of Appeal decision).  See Lands 
Tribunal Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 17 §8(8) (H.K.) (outlining the powers of the Lands 
Tribunal to issue orders after a tenancy is terminated). 
203  There was no objection based on the retrospective effect: Official Record of 
Proceedings, Legislative Council, (May 29, 1991) (H.K.).  See Immigration Ordinance, 
(1997) Cap. 115, §13D(5) (H.K.) (“For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that 
any person detained under subsection (1) in any place may, under the authority of the 
Director of Immigration, be transferred from that place and detained in any other place or 
places specified by the Director of Immigration.”).  
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“rainstorm warning” under section 5(4)(f) was restored to its 
original meaning (to include red warning) in line with the previous 
definition, which was based on another statute that had been 
inadvertently altered when the latter, referencing the statute, was 
amended for a different policy consideration.204    
C. Taxing Power 
As is typical with the constitutional structure of other 
nations,205 Article 73 of the Basic Law provides that the power to 
“approve taxation” and “enact, amend or repeal laws” is vested in 
the legislative branch (i.e., the Legislative Council),206 though laws 
relating to government policies are primarily introduced by the 
executive branch. 207   Prior written approval of the Chief 
Executive208 is required before members of the Legislative Council 
can introduce such bills.209 
 
 The vesting of the taxing powers and general legislative 
powers in the legislative branch means that the executive branch did 
not have any legal basis to collect the tax before the amendments 
were actually passed.  Indeed, this is what happened in practice.  As 
explained by the Secretary for Transport and Housing in the first 
reading of the 2010 amendment implementing the SSD:  
Before the new law comes into effect, the Inland Revenue 
Department (IRD) will record the residential property transactions 
                                                
204 The referencing statue, the Judicial Proceedings (Adjournment During Gale Warnings) 
Ordinance (c. 62), was amended to minimize disruption to the judicial process without 
intending to affect general employment. The amendment of Employee’s Compensation 
Ordinance was retrospectively made effective on the date the referencing statue was 
amended.  Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 5623, 5749-50, (Apr. 5, 
2000) (H.K.); Official Reports of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 3899-900, (Feb. 16, 
2010) (H.K.). 
205 See BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 172, at 347-8 (discussing the authority for taxation 
in the U.K.); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 280-3 (5th  ed. 2005) 
(discussing the extent of U.S. Congress’s taxing power); Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 738 
(observing the legal and political foundation of the doctrine). 
206 See Cullen et al., supra note 87, at 326-8 (discussing the Legislative Council role in 
budget and fiscal control). 
207 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 62 (H.K.). 
208 Under Hong Kong current political institution arrangement, the Chief Executive is the 
head of government, akin to the Governor of Hong Kong under British colonial rule.  See 
Benny Tai, The Chief Executive, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 181 (Johannes 
Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011) (discussing the appointment and powers of the Chief 
Executive). 
209 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 74 (H.K.). 
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between 20 November 2010 and the date of coming into effect of 
the new law to identify the cases liable for SSD.  Demand notes on 
SSD will then be issued after the new legislation is enacted.  And 
during this period, the IRD will continue to allow and approve 
applications for deferring stamp duty payment on agreements made 
in accordance with the prevailing legislation, until the new law 
comes into effect.” 210  A similar arrangement was provided for the 
BSD.211 
 
 Interestingly, members of the executive branch publicly 
acknowledged the role of the legislature in authorizing such 
statutory measures,212 even if there was a certain irony when the 
Financial Secretary observed that “[g]iven the effectiveness of the 
Special Stamp Duty, I hope Members will pass the Bill as soon as 
possible so that the Government can proceed with the initiative.”213  
There is a little cognitive dissonance in discussing the demonstrated 
effectiveness of a measure that is supposedly yet to be enacted.    
D. Summary: Legislation by Press Release is Legal 
In summary, the use of legislation by press release to 
implement the BSD and other property cooling taxations is legal in 
Hong Kong.  The constitutional prohibition against retrospective 
laws is only limited to criminal sanctions, and the provision of a 
detailed announcement would have survived an expansive 
interpretation of both the legality and proportionality principles.  As 
evidenced by the numerous past examples of retrospective laws, 
including a couple of cases of legislation by press release, there is 
no legal prohibition of retrospective non-criminal laws in general, 
and legislation by press release in particular.  The postponing of the 
tax collection until legislative enactment, while maintaining a record 
                                                
210 Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 3319, 3442-3, (Dec. 8, 2010) 
(H.K.). 
211 Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100 (“IRD will record all the residential 
property transactions between 27 October 2012 and the date on which the new law comes 
into effect, and demand notes for the SSD underpaid / BSD will be issued after the new 
legislation is enacted.”). 
212 E.g., Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 3319, 3442-3 (Dec. 8, 2010) 
(H.K.) (quoting the Secretary for Transport and Housing, “I look forward to the early 
passage of the Bill by the Council to give legal effect to these stamp duty related 
proposals”). 
213 Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 9037, 9158 (Apr. 13, 2011) (H.K.) 
(emphasis added). 
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of taxable transactions in the meantime, also navigates around the 
formal legislative requirements for tax implementation.  Thus, 
notwithstanding the murmurs about the issue of 
“constitutionality,”214 the practice is legal not only in Hong Kong, 
but also in most other jurisdictions that do not have an explicit 
prohibition on retrospective civil legislation.  
 
In this regard, it is pertinent to observe that the political 
controversy over the inclusion of the empowering provision to allow 
the Financial Secretary to make immediate legal changes to the rates 
of the BSD and SSD215 is ultimately a red herring.  Without the 
benefit of the empowering section in the Bill or any other laws, the 
initial October 2012 announcement was a mere government policy 
announcement that did not have any formal legal effect.  However, 
this lack of formal legal effect posed no obstacle to the 
announcement’s real and direct effects on the property market.  The 
announced retrospectivity of the pending legal changes was more 
than sufficient to achieve immediate de facto legal effects.  
Concerns about “administrative tyranny” would have to be 
addressed through reforming the legal status of retrospective laws 
rather than the mere fixation of a particular empowering provision.   
 
V. TOWARDS BETTER LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE 
Although the practice of legislation by press release is 
generally legal in most jurisdictions, the normative considerations of 
the practice are more nuanced.  As discussed above in Part II.C., 
there are important merits and shortcomings associated with the 
practice.  This Part identifies and examines the three criteria that are 
instrumental in assessing whether the use of legislation by press 
release in a particular circumstance is normatively justified.   
A. Certainty and Consistency with an Initial Announcement 
Given that legislation by press release is designed to mitigate 
the otherwise unjust disruption of individuals’ reliance on the law 
arising from the retrospectivity of the law, it is relatively obvious 
                                                
214 Law Society of Hong Kong, supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
215 See supra III.C. 
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that an example of well-executed legislation by press release would 
require that its initial announcement set out the pending law with 
sufficient clarity and that any substantial deviations in the eventual 
legislation should not be retrospectively applied.  In the same way 
that clarity would be a desirable trait of any enacted legislation,216 
clarity of the initial announcement is crucial in light of the 
announcement’s substantial and intended effect to guide the conduct 
of private entities.  
 
In terms of changes, the legislative process through which 
the final legislation is enacted inevitably would introduce some 
differences vis-à-vis the initial announcement.  Some differences 
may be relatively inconsequential amendments to the wording, 
while others may be substantive departures.  The former is 
uncontroversial, but material inconsistencies negate the advantages 
of legislation by press release and reintroduce the harm of 
conventional retrospective laws.  Private individuals who conducted 
their affairs in accordance with the rules set forth in the initial 
announcement prior to passage of the final legislation would be 
caught off-guard by those subsequent changes as with any 
conventional retrospective laws.  Of course, substantive departures 
from the initial announcement are not per se undesirable.  Indeed, 
such changes are typically the result of deliberation during the 
legislative process and reflect legislative scrutiny of important 
policies under a healthy democratic process.  The point is simply 
that those changes not envisaged by the initial announcement should 
only be prospectively applied.  
 
In this regard, it is unfortunate that the withdrawal of the 
exemption for Hong Kong Permanent Resident minors was 
retrospectively applied until October 2012.217  Until the government 
publicly announced its change of heart in January 2014, all public 
representations from the government had continuously and 
                                                
216 Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment, 
and Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 162-4 (2009) (discussing the undesirable 
ambiguity arising from discerning the appropriate legal precedent from plurality court 
decisions and circuit splits).  See, e.g., Ji Lian Yap, Constructive Notice and Company 
Charges, 10 J. CORPORATE L. STUD. 265, 274-7 (2010) (discussing the considerations of 
certainty of both the statutory provision of the charges registration regime and the 
consequential information available to third parties. 
217 See supra III.C. 
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specifically provided for this exemption.218  Unlike the other two 
changes, which expanded the circumstances in which the BSD 
would be exempted/refunded, this withdrawal was clearly and 
substantially detrimental to the affected private entities.  It is easy to 
sympathize with the unpleasant shock to buyers who designed their 
property purchase in reliance on this express exemption during the 
period between October 2012 and January 2014 only to face a hefty 
15% tax with the passage of the law.219  To aggravate the injury, the 
government’s insistence on retrospectively applying this withdrawal 
of exemption can be contrasted with the decision of the government 
in 1992 not to retrospectively apply a similar withdrawal of tax 
exemption for “small ticket leasing” given the ambiguity of the 
initial announcement.220  This withdrawal will pose an interesting 
legal issue with respect to the expanded notion of “law” and the 
proportionality principle if litigated in Hong Kong,221 but such a 
withdrawal is clearly undesirable from a normative perspective in 
any event. 
B. The Necessity(?) of Legislation by Press Release 
Beyond certainty and consistency, the next criterion for 
evaluation focuses on whether the use of legislation by press release 
is actually necessary.  This criterion is independent of whether the 
substantive aspects of the laws are desirable.  Rather, the inquiry 
proceeds on the assumption that the underlying policy objective is 
sound and focuses on whether the short-circuiting of the legislative 
process under legislation by press release is necessary to achieve the 
policy objective.  In this regard, it is worth examining possible 
                                                
218 As with the other taxes, the Inland Revenue Department posted a detailed FAQ setting 
out the specifics of the BSD.  To question 7 “Whether an agreement for sale signed by a 
non-HKPR to acquire a residential property and hold it as a trustee for a HKPR is subject 
to BSD?”, the response was “An agreement for sale signed by a non-HKPR in the capacity 
of a trustee on behalf of a HKPR is chargeable with BSD, unless the HKPR is a minor or a 
mentally incapacitated person.”  A qualification was only added to this question, without 
modifying the initial response, in January 2014, see Buyers Stamp Duty, 
http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/faq/bsd.htm (last updated Aug. 8, 2004) (“The Administration 
has accepted the views of the members of Bills Committee of the Legislative Council and 
decided to withdraw the proposed BSD exemption for HKPR minors.”).  
219  Zhang Weiwei, Wei chengnian zhiye zhe huobei zhuisu jiaoshui [Minor Property 
Purchasers May Faced Retrospective Tax Bill], SINGTAO DAILY (HK), Feb. 22, 2014, at A4. 
220 See supra IV.B.4. 
221 See supra IV.B.2.  No litigation has been publicly announced thus far. 
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justifications for conventional retrospective legislation that might 
also be applicable to legislation by press release.  
1. Changing Nature: Beyond Curative Legislation 
Notwithstanding the negative image commonly associated 
with retrospective laws, there are circumstances in which 
retrospectivity is justified and desirable.  The most common and 
least controversial form of retrospective laws is “curative 
legislation,” which can be further classified into the different sub-
categories: “routine revision,” “restorative legislation,” “validating 
legislation” and “overturning judicial decisions.”222  The majority of 
the Hong Kong examples of retrospective laws discussed in IV.B.4 
fit into one of these sub-categories and provide useful contrasts to 
the retrospectivity involved in implementing the BSD.   
 
Routine revisions are retrospective amendments to relatively 
minor errors, such as typographical errors or unforeseen changes 
caused by amendments to other legislation. 223   The 1988 
amendment to the Societies Ordinance, the 2000 amendment to the 
Employee’s Compensation Ordinance amendment in 2000 and the 
2005 amendment to the Bankruptcy Ordinance would fall under this 
category.  
 
Validating legislation addresses more substantive drafting 
defects in legislation and is usually intended to “validate” erroneous 
interpretations of the law by the government or private entities.224  
Examples include the 1991 amendment to the Immigration 
Ordinance that was meant to retrospectively ensure the legality of 
the transfer of Vietnamese detainees by the Immigration 
Department and the 2000 amendment to the Family Status 
Discrimination Ordinance that shielded employers from possible 
contraventions of the law.  
 
Overturning judicial decisions is self-explanatory and is 
represented by the 1995 amendment to the Lands Tribunal 
Ordinance, which explicitly stated its intent to reverse a 1993 Court 
                                                
222 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 104-18. 
223 Id. at 104-5; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 237-8. 
224 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 107-15; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 239-45. 
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of Appeal decision.225  Restorative legislation addresses legislative 
schemes that have unintentionally been allowed to lapse.226  None of 
the Hong Kong examples falls into this last category, possibly due 
to the uncommon use of a “sunset” clause in Hong Kong.227  
 
 The focus of this Article, legislation by press release, has 
been previously employed a couple of times in Hong Kong to tackle 
tax avoidance.  The 1987 and 1992 amendments to the Inland 
Revenue Ordinance were both designed to close tax loopholes and 
were both backdated to the date of announcement. 228   This 
experience echoes that of Australia, where the most frequent use of 
legislation by press release was to combat the then-rampant tax 
avoidance industry.229  The fact that these examples of legislation by 
press release are designed to tackle tax avoidance is significant 
insofar as they could be classified under the conventional curative 
legislation category—in particular, the sub-category of validating 
legislation.  An argument could be made that certain tax loopholes 
are never intended by the legislature in the first place and that 
retrospective amendment is simply intended to restore the original 
legislative purpose.  In a 2013 case involving retrospective tax, the 
European Court of Human Rights, in assessing the principle of 
legality, observed that “retroactive taxation can be applicable 
essentially to remedy technical deficiencies of the law.” 230  
Moreover, because the expectations by tax avoiders are really 
neither rational nor legitimate, the retrospective closing of loopholes 
is arguably justified even if the backdating extends beyond the date 
of the legislative announcement.231  
                                                
225 Official Reports of Proceedings, Legislative Council, (Nov. 29, 1995) (H.K.); Official 
Reports of Proceedings Legislative Council, (Nov. 2, 1995), (H.K). 
226 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 105-7; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 239. 
227 Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Draft Committee 
Stage Amendments Proposed by the Hon Tommy CHEUNG Yu-yan, 2013 CB(1) 594/13-
14(01), (Dec., 2013) (the Government was repeatedly adamant against any sunset clause 
for the BSD and the SSD).  For the earlier rejection of sunset clause for the SSD in 2011, 
see Legislative Council Secretariat, Bills Committee on Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) 
Bill 2010, CB(1) 2444/10-11, (June 16, 2011).  Official Reports of Proceedings, 
Legislative Council, 12564 (June 22, 2011) (H.K.) (sunset clause was also rejected for the 
Interception of Communication and Surveillance Bill). 
228 See supra Part IV.B.4. 
229 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 263. 
230 R. Sz., supra note 181, at ¶ 40. 
231 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 147-51, 245-6; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 257-9. 
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 By contrast, the BSD represents a significant departure.  The 
BSD is an entirely novel form of taxation that has no equivalent in 
the existing tax law of Hong Kong, which generally does not 
impose different transaction taxes based on the identity of the 
parties. 232   Thus, there could be no arguments about these 
retrospective amendments being curative in nature.  In addition, the 
BSD, while a form of tax, is not enacted for the purpose of revenue 
but for the specific goal of curbing the perceived overheated 
property market.233  This, again, can be contrasted with the more 
typical anti-avoidance type of legislation by press release in taxation, 
whether in Hong Kong or in Australia.  Indeed, although legislation 
by press release is by no means limited to tax avoidance and has in 
fact been employed on substantive regulatory matters in other 
jurisdictions,234 the BSD appears to be part of an emerging practice 
by the Hong Kong government to utilize legislation by press release 
for economic regulation.  Beginning with the SSD in 2010 and 
continuing until the 2013 implementation of another property-
cooling tax (the Double Stamp Duty [DSD]),235 all three taxes have 
been driven by non-revenue policy objectives. Indeed, this departure 
is even more significant given that, although taxation is an 
important instrument commonly used by other jurisdictions to effect 
important social and economic policies,236 taxation has previously 
occupied a much smaller policy footprint in Hong Kong.237 
                                                
232 See Stamp Duty Ordinance, supra note 91, § 41-4 (finding exemptions to the stamp 
duty are sometime provided for the usual suspects of government, foreign diplomatic 
institutions and charitable organizations).  See generally DELOITTE, HONG KONG MASTER 
TAX GUIDE 817-84 (12th ed., 2011) (discussing Hong Kong’s transaction tax regime, 
including exemptions).  
233 Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100, at 1. 
234 Recent examples include the prohibition of severance of common land rights in the U.K. 
and the change in foreign takeovers regulation in Australia.  SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 
157; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 262-4. 
235 As a further measure to curb property speculation, the DSD doubled the stamp duties 
for all property transactions, with an exception for except first-time local buyers, was 
introduced in February 23, 2013 with legislation by press release.  See Olga Wong et al., 
New stamp duties trigger last minute push for flat sales, S. Duties Trigger Scramble for 
Sales, S. CHINA MORNING POST, (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/article/1156620/new-stamp-duties-trigger-rush-flat-sales; Extra stamp duty, ‘to hit 
speculators only’, says financial secretary Tsang, S.Hit Speculators Only”, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/article/1157816/extra-stamp-duty-hit-speculators-only-says-financial-secretary-
tsang?page=all. 
236 Gribnau, supra note 31, at 53. 
237 See Cullen et al., supra note 87, at 331-9 (discussing the low rate, narrow base, and 
straightforward tax regime in Hong Kong). 
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2. Justification: Risk of Circumvention? 
Without the ability to resort to a justification based on the 
curative nature of the retrospective amendments, the justification for 
backdating the legislation to the date of announcement must rest on 
preventing circumvention by private entities.  Given that the 
legislative process inevitably takes time, even for non-controversial 
matters, failure to retrospectively apply the new law to the date of 
announcement would likely result in a surge of activities that the 
new law sought to prevent.238  Moreover, whereas the legislation by 
press release is designed to tackle tax avoidance, the initial 
announcement would ironically serve as a public notification of the 
existence and legality of these tax loopholes if the announcement 
were not accompanied by intent of retrospective application.239  
 
The risk of circumvention that would severely undermine 
legislative purposes is particularly acute when the activities 
involved are durable (i.e., the activities will implicate a relatively 
long-term time horizon).  The purchase of real property—the 
subject matter of the BSD—is the classic example.  The purchase of 
real property by most private entities is usually a substantial 
investment that is likely to forestall future purchases over an 
extended period, typically measured in terms of years or even 
decades.  Without legislation by press release, it is entirely possible 
and foreseeable that there would be an incredible surge of property 
purchases in the several months between the date of announcement 
and the eventual enactment240 that would be likely to exhaust the 
demand (and supply) for the property for the subsequent year or 
years.  Similar analysis also applies to vehicles—restrictions on 
vehicle ownership in a bid to reduce traffic congestion must be 
implemented immediately from the policy announcement to prevent 
a mere shifting of the future demand for vehicles into the interval 
between the policy announcement and legislative enactment.241 
                                                
238 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1089; Palmer & Sampford, 
supra note 3, at 264. See also Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 738-40 (discussing the problem of 
“forestalling” by private entities in response to knowledge of the pending tax). 
239 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 263-4.  
240 The initial SSD took a whole of eight months to pass. Official Reports of Proceedings, 
Legislative Council, 12660-61 (June 22, 2010) (H.K.). 
241 The recent implementation of a vehicle quota in the Chinese city of Guangzhou were 
preceded by an announcement the evening before implementation, though the ability to 
“streamline” the legislative and regulatory process under Chinese less-than-democratic 
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Nonetheless, it is important to appreciate the nuances of the 
risk of circumstances posed by the different policy objectives 
because the mere fact that transactions are shifted into the period 
between the policy announcement and eventual enactment does not 
always defeat the legislative purpose.  When the objective is the 
raising of revenue (such as closing tax avoidance loopholes) or the 
curbing of a particular activity (such as restricting vehicle 
ownership), the legislative objectives are thwarted because the lack 
of retrospective application would mean that the shifting would 
reduce the revenue collected (for the former) or fail to reduce the 
level of activity (for the later).242  
 
The circumstances are more complicated for the BSD, 
whose primary goal is not revenue raising243 but the twin economic 
regulatory goals of cooling the property market and reducing 
demand from foreign property purchasers.244  Without retrospective 
application of the BSD, the common prediction is that there would 
be a rush of foreign speculators purchasing property before the 
BSD’s implementation,245 resulting in an increase in demand for 
property that is likely to inflate prices further prior to the BSD’s 
                                                                                                           
institutional framework meant that this immediate implementation can be achieved via 
prospective regulations rather than legislation by press release.  Zhou An, Guangzhou: 
“yaohao + paipai” nengfou cheng zhidu liangfang [Guangzhou: Can “Lottery + Auction” 
be Ideal Solution for Congestion?], RENMIN GONGAN BAO – JIATONG ANQUAN ZHOUKAN, 
July 17, 2012, at 4.  For a comparative discussion of these traffic congestion management 
policies, see generally Jianlin Chen & Jiongzhe Cui, More Market-Oriented Than U.S. And 
More Socialist Than China: A Comparative Public Property Story of Singapore, Vol. 23, 1 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2014). 
242 See also Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to 
Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 825-6 (2009) (discussing the 
danger of the preemptive clearing of ecologically valuable habitat by private land owners 
between the proposal of relevant environmental preservation regulation and 
implementation of the regulation, which typically do not include retrospective effect). 
243 Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100, Annex F (“The proposed adjustments to 
the existing SSD and the introduction of the BSD are not intended to be revenue-
generating measures to meet fiscal or budgetary objectives, although they are expected to 
bring about additional revenue to the Government.”). 
244 Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100. 
245 There was a rush by foreign buyers to purchase property during the short interval 
between the policy announcement and actual implementation.  See supra Part: supra III.B. 
Previously, this issue of circumvention has served as the common justification for 
legislation by press release.  See Paper for the House Committee Meeting on 10 June 2011: 
Bills Committee on Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010, CB(1) 2399/10-11, at 3 
(2011) (concerning the  (implementation of the SSD in 2011); see also Official Record of 
Proceedings, Legislative Council, *1, *44 (Nov. 27, 1991) (H.K.) (concerning the 1992 
amendment of the Inland Revenue Ordinance). 
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actual implementation.  However, if property prices in Hong Kong 
are indeed driven up by speculators, then the mere notice that the 
BSD will become applicable sometime in the foreseeable future is 
likely to dampen the demand immediately because speculators 
(including foreign speculators) will not be keen on investing too 
much in a property that is likely to face increased impediments (i.e., 
reduced demand by foreigners) in the foreseeable future. 246  
Similarly, demand by entities exempted from the BSD (i.e., Hong 
Kong permanent residents) is likely to be shifted to the period after 
the BSD’s implementation on the expectation of price decreases at 
that time, further diluting the demand during the transitional period.  
These factors are likely to create a downward pressure on price, 
allowing the government to achieve some “cooling” of the property 
market and discouragement of foreign property purchasers by the 
mere announcement of the legislature’s plan to impose the BSD. 
 
However, other characteristics of the Hong Kong property 
market do increase the risk of thwarting the legislative objective.  
First, companies are subjected to the BSD, but unlike the purchase 
of property by foreign natural persons, the subsequent transfer of the 
shares of the one-property company (i.e., a commonly used 
corporate structure in Hong Kong in which a company is set with 
the sole purpose of holding a property) would not be subjected to 
the BSD or any real estate transaction stamp duty.247  Thus, both 
foreign and local speculators can purchase a property using a 
company vehicle before the implementation of the BSD with 
knowledge that the future transfer of the property would not be 
subjected to any BSD regardless of the identity of the future 
purchasers.  This speculative activity is only partially hindered by 
the transaction costs involved in the use of company structure and 
the reluctance of some purchasers concerned with not having direct 
ownership over the property. 248 
                                                
246 NICHOLAS G. PIROUNAKIS, REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS: A POINT-TO-POINT HANDBOOK 
211-5 (2013); Hong Kong’ own experience evidenced this trite point.  The property and 
stock market crashes in the earlier 1980s were founded simply on the possible 
consequences of China’s exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997.  Chan, supra 
note 80, at 16-7.  For a discussion of the sources of risks, including legal and taxation risks, 
and their impact on current property value, see DAVID ISAAC & JOHN O’LEARY, PROPERTY 
VALUATION TECHNIQUES 172-8 (3d ed. 2013). 
247 Ng & Li, supra note 146, at 3. 
248 Id. Interestingly, the fact that these negative factors are disproportionately more onerous 
for residential property of a lower value actually meant that they further negate the risks of 
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Second, given the inevitably time-consuming process of property 
development and the issue of land scarcity in Hong Kong, the 
shifting of property purchase forward into the transitional period 
may adversely disrupt supply in the foreseeable future.  Insofar as 
there might be a greater proportion of foreign buyers within the 
transitional period, there would be a lower supply of property for 
local buyers after the BSD is finally implemented.  Indeed, this 
situation is likely to be aggravated by developers pushing forward 
the launch of new property in response to the pending 
implementation of the BSD.249  As noted above, developers in Hong 
Kong are able to push forward the property launch by a day with 
only a few hours’ notice.250  
3. The Proper Focus of Inquiry 
The various aforementioned factors point in different and 
often opposing directions.  On balance, legislation by press release 
is most likely necessary to achieve the purported policy objectives 
in the particular context of Hong Kong.  Yet, the key takeaway is 
that this conclusion of necessity is not as straightforward as most 
assume.  Indeed, it is telling that the government’s explanatory 
document on the BSD presented to the legislature in October 2012 
did not even attempt to justify the use of legislation by press release 
in the section concerning implementation,251 with only a cursory 
mention of “[g]iven the price-sensitive nature of the property market, 
the proposed new measures shall take effect from the day 
immediately following the announcement” in the final report of the 
amendment bill. 252   Notwithstanding the necessity being more 
obvious in the most commonly used context of tax avoidance, 
retrospective applications are not always necessary in other policy 
contexts.  Moreover, even when revenue generation is the primary 
                                                                                                           
circumventing legislative objectives, in so far as the main policy consideration is to make 
housing affordable to the lower-middle class in Hong Kong.   
249  See TIM HAVARD, FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY STUDIES FOR PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 26-30 (2014) (discussing the various constraints that developers 
consider when planning for a development project, including market timing, political 
environment and planning rules); PIROUNAKIS, supra note 246, at 215-26 (discussing the 
calculus of the developer). 
250 See supra Part III.B. 
251 Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100 (PIN?). 
252 Report of the Bills Committee on Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012, CB(1) 904/13-14, 
3 (Feb. 18, 2014). 
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policy goal, Joseph Jaconelli observed that there may be 
circumstances in which shifting forward the targeted tax activities 
might produce sufficient beneficial side benefits (e.g., a short-term 
stimulus to the economy) that could mitigate the loss in revenue.253   
 
Charles Sampford, in his earlier 1993 article with Andrew 
Palmer, made a similar point, albeit only in passing, when 
discussing the 1987 enactment of the Broadcasting (Ownership and 
Control) Act as an illustrative example of how Parliament was 
compelled to enact retrospective legislation for which the presiding 
policy announcement had been relied on by private entities.254  In 
that scenario, a flurry of transactions of media ownership had taken 
place in response to and in reliance on the Australian government’s 
announcement to modify ownership restrictions on broadcasters.255  
In addition to noting the harm of undermining the parliament, they 
correctly observed that the undermining of the parliament was 
aggravated by the fact that “there was no good reason why the 
Government had to make the changes effective from the date of 
announcement.  Delaying the introduction of the new rule until it 
was enacted would simply have delayed the firing of the starting-
gun for the mad media scramble from the date of the announcement 
to the date of enactment.”256  Indeed, they further articulated that the 
retrospectivity in legislation by press release  
 
“[S]hould be restricted to situations where there is a genuine 
need for immediate action, or where the making of an 
announcement that the law is to be changed would, unless coupled 
with a promise to make the change effective from the date of 
                                                
253 Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 739.  Cf. Emanuela Carbonara et al., Unjust Laws and Illegal 
Norms, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 285, 295 (2012) (discussing how the immediate effect of 
legal changes may be useful in reducing social opposition to unpopular laws).   
254 Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 265-6. 
255 Id. The modification changed a prohibition in any person owning more than 5% in more 
than two television broadcasting companies to a prohibition targeted cross-media 
ownership and prohibiting media owners from having combined access to 60% or more of 
the national population through the regulated medium of television, radio, and daily 
newspapers.  For a discussion on the background context for the legal change, see Jock 
Given, Cross-Media Ownership Laws: Refinement or Rejection?, 30(1) U.N.S.W. L.J. 258, 
259-61 (2007); David J. Brennan, Printing in England and Broadcasting in Australia: A 
Comparative Study of Regulatory Impulse, 22 ADEL. L. REV. 63, 79-80 (2000). 
256 Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 266. 
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announcement, allow citizens to gain some unwarranted advantage 
from their foreknowledge of the change.”257 
   
These valid points were subsequently and surprisingly 
omitted by Charles Sampford in his more comprehensive (and much 
lengthier) book covering essentially the same ground, including the 
use of the exact same example when discussing the illustrative 
example of legislation by press release undermining parliament.258  
This omission is unfortunate because whether retrospectivity is 
necessary in relation to the policy goals is clearly relevant for 
assessing the use of legislation by press release.  
 
Moreover, although considerations about the “genuine need 
for immediate action” and “some unwarranted advantage from their 
foreknowledge of the [legal] change”259 are aimed in the right 
direction, they all stem from the fundamental issue of whether 
shifting forward the activities targeted by the legal change would 
derail the legislative objectives.  As illustrated by the case study of 
the BSD, these considerations would first entail identifying what the 
purported legislative objectives are, followed by examining the 
incentives created by the policy announcement for private entities, 
to predict and assess whether the responses to the announcement 
would undermine the legislative objectives if the legal change is not 
to have retrospective effects until the announcement.  
C. Implications of Political Dynamic  
The case study of the BSD also reveals an interesting nuance 
to the harm arising from the use of legislation by press release, 
namely, how the political dynamic of a jurisdiction can either 
aggravate or mitigate these harms, whether it be undermining the 
legislature, inherent uncertainty, or excessive delay.260  
1. Implications of Political Dynamic 
The political dynamic of a jurisdiction is the product of the 
interplay between the formal constitutional structure and political 
                                                
257 Id., at 266. 
258 See SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160-1. 
259 Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 266. 
260 See supra Part II.C. 
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competition on the ground.  In terms of formal constitutional 
structure, it is important to observe that the use of legislation by 
press release in Australia and the U.K., the jurisdictions surveyed by 
Charles Sampford in the relevant section of his book,261 is not 
particularly controversial given the institutional designs of these two 
jurisdictions.  The U.K. adopts a Westminster parliamentary system 
in which the executive branch (consisting of the Prime Minister and 
the Cabinet, which is appointed by the Prime Minister) is typically 
of the same political party as that holding the majority of seats in the 
legislature.262  The parliamentary system is similar in Australia, 
where the political composition of the legislature (the House of 
Representatives) and the executive (the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet) are often identical, though there is a slight complication 
arising from an additional elected Senate that was originally 
designed to safeguard states’ rights (through equal seats per state, 
regardless of differences in population) and has some significant 
veto power over legislation (especially when compared to the 
U.K.’s House of Lords, which has a more advisory-oriented role).263   
 
Similarly, in Sweden, where the prohibition on retroactive 
taxation is subject to the exception of what is essentially legislation 
by press release, the head of the executive is again selected by the 
legislature.264  Given the intentional close proximity between the 
legislature and the executive under the formal institutional 
arrangements of these jurisdictions, the danger and harm of the 
perceived executive’s usurping of legislative power via legislation 
by press release are more illusory than real.  Uncertainty and delay 
in the legislative outcome are also likely to be less severe in such 
circumstances.  This situation is unlike the U.S.-style separation of 
powers, where it is common for the executive and the legislature to 
be of different political compositions and to be sometimes at severe 
loggerheads with one another.265       
                                                
261 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 156-64.  Australia and the U.K. are also common law 
jurisdictions discussed in the literature involving legislation by press release. See Hayes & 
Wilson, supra note 8; Infobank, supra note 9. 
262 BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 172, at 84-5; CARROLL, supra note 172, at 227-45; 
PETER LEYLAND & GORDON ANTHONY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 20-6 (7th ed. 2013). 
263 KEYZER, supra note 54, at 10-3, 52-3; Stewart & Walker, supra note 8, at 194-5. 
264 Bernard Michael Ortwein II, The Swedish Legal System: An Introduction, 13 IND. INT'L 
& COMP. L. REV. 405, 407-11 (2003); Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 271-2. 
265  CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 119-56, 170-201 (4th ed. 2009). 
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The political competition at any given time does shape the 
relationship between the executive and the legislature and can 
materially affect the power of the executive.  For example, the 
executive under a Westminster-style parliamentary system will 
wield considerably less power (including the power to effect 
legislation by press release) when the parliamentary majority of the 
corresponding political party is weak or when there is internal 
division within the majority party.266  This situation can cause 
considerable uncertainty and delay in the legislative process and 
may result in the final legislation departing substantially from the 
original announcement 267  or in the retrospective effect being 
removed altogether.268  On the other hand, the actual dominance of 
one political party in the elections is likely to transcend whatever 
formal separation of powers exists and produce consistency between 
the executive’s policy objectives and the legislature’s legislative 
activities.269  In this latter scenario, especially if coupled with strong 
party structure/discipline among the political parties, the use of 
legislation by press release by the executive—even in a U.S.-style 
separation of powers system—would only minimally undermine the 




                                                
266 See CARROLL, supra note 172, at 227-30, 235-9 (discussing the power of the executive 
branch with reference to U.K. political dynamic). 
267  For example, the final 60% population-reach rule under the 1987 enactment of 
Australia’s Broadcasting (Ownership and Control) Act was a departure from the initially 
announced 75%.  Given, supra note 255, at 259-61; Brennan, supra note 255, at 79-80. 
268 Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 269.  See also Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 274-5 
(noting Swedish examples). 
269 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 26, at 2315 (“We emphasize that the degree and kind of 
competition between the legislature and executive branches vary significantly, and may all 
but disappear, depending on whether the House, Senate, and presidency are divided or 
unified by political party.”).  See also Kammer, supra note 26, at 97-106 (discussing how 
politically influential private parties, such as political parties and interest groups, can 
transcend the formal division of power between state and federal government); Cornelia 
Pillard, Unitariness and Myopia: The Executive Branch, Legal Process, and Torture, 81 
IND. L.J. 1297, 1298-300 (2006) (“In the context of one-party dominance of the three 
branches, however, the rights-protecting effect of separation of powers is reduced. That 
effect is further diminished regarding matters of national security and war, which trigger 
partially unreviewable power in the political branches.  Following 9/11, with Republicans 
dominating all three branches and war ongoing, risks of governmental myopia ran high.”). 
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2. Hong Kong’s Fragmented and Antagonistic Political Landscape 
This insight regarding the implications of the political 
dynamic on the use of legislation by press release is particularly 
relevant for Hong Kong, given the ongoing political transition of its 
fledgling democracy under the “One country Two systems” 
regime.270  Prior to the handover to China in 1997, Hong Kong was 
essentially governed through the British colonial government, a 
largely executive apparatus with only limited checks from the 
partially elected legislature.271  This conspicuous formal lack of 
separation of powers and any material political competition meant 
that the use of legislation by press release, such as the 1987 and 
1992 amendments to the Inland Revenue Ordinance,272 could not be 
any less controversial or problematic.273  
 
The situation has changed considerably since the time of the 
handover.  The legislature, Legislative Council (LegCo), is now 
significantly more autonomous vis-à-vis the executive, with all 
LegCo members now being elected.274  The Basic Law also codifies 
the lawmaking and budget-approving powers of the legislature,275 
together with the ability to override the veto of the Chief 
Executive.276  The Chief Executive, the head of the Hong Kong 
government, is also separately elected, 277  though the current 
arrangement provides for a somewhat limited election by an 
                                                
270 For a discussion of the “one country, two systems” policy, see C.L. Lim & Johannes 
Chan, Autonomy and Central-Local Relations, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 
37 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2011). 
271  Bill K.P. Chou, Election Without Fair Representation: Hong Kong’s Legislative 
Council and its Implications for Non-liberal Regimes, in PARLIAMENTS IN ASIA: 
INSTITUTION BUILDING AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 228, 229 (Zheng Yongnian et al. eds., 
2014).  For a discussion of colonial era governance institutions in Hong Kong, see 
NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 68-82 (5th ed. 1991); 
WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 160, at 154-68; Chen, supra note 115, at 217-28, 230. 
272 See supra Part IV.B.2.4. 
273 See MINERS, supra note 271, at 77-8 (discussing the rare instances where the Legislative 
Council rejected or significantly altered the legislative bills put forward by Hong Kong’s 
executive branch). 
274 XIANGGANG JIBENN FA art. 68 (H.K.); Lam, supra note 115, at 138; Chen, supra note 
115, at 230-1. 
275 XIANGGANG JIBENN FA art. 73 (H.K.).  See Chou, supra note 271, at 236. 
276 XIANGGANG JIBENN FA art. 49-50 (H.K.).  If the LegCo can produce a two third majority 
after the initial veto, then the Chief Executive must either sign the bill or dissolve the 
legislature.  The Chief Executive can only dissolve the legislature once in each term of 
office.  
277 XIANGGANG JIBENN FA art. 45 (H.K). 
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Election Committee that is not itself either directly elected by the 
population or accountable in any way to the LegCo.278  Moreover, 
the Chief Executive, upon successful election, must declare that he 
or she is not a member of any political party,279 further diluting any 
relationship with the dominant political party of the legislature.280  
 
This formal separation of power is aggravated by the 
increasingly intense and antagonistic political competition in Hong 
Kong.  The political participants in Hong Kong can be largely 
divided into two camps based on their perception and advocacy on 
the relationship with the Chinese central government.281  On the one 
hand, the “pro-establishment” camp favors a closer relationship, or 
at least the maintenance of the status quo in terms of China’s role in 
Hong Kong’s economic and social life.  The “pan-democrats,” on 
the other hand, advocate greater autonomy for Hong Kong, 
including a more liberal democratic institution that is distinct from 
the Chinese government’s conceptualization of good governance.282  
The “pan-democrats” have consistently garnered a solid majority of 
the popular vote in elections by universal suffrage, but they occupy 
only a minority in the LegCo due to the institutional design of the 
LegCo—in particular, the use of functional constituencies in which 
members are elected from a defined electorate, typically based on 
                                                
278 Tai, supra note 208, at 187-94; SIMON N. M. YOUNG & RICHARD CULLEN, ELECTING 
HONG KONG’S CHIEF EXECUTIVE 20-27 (2010); Tai, supra note 208, at 187-94.  
279 Chief Executive Election Ordinance (2012) (HK).  The eligibility requirement is set out 
in sections 13 and 14 of the Chief Executive Election Ordinance, and the typical 
requirements based on age, nationality/residency, mental capacity, and lack of criminal 
record.  See YOUNG & CULLEN, supra note 278, at 80-2 (providing an academic discussion 
on eligibility to be Chief Executive). 
280 Lam, supra note 115, at 141.  Cf., Chou, supra note 271, at 236 (noting how the co-
optation of certain leaders of the political party into “a system of consultative organs with 
the Executive Council at the apex” allows the Chief Executive to “build up his ‘ruling 
coalition’”). 
281 Chen, supra note 115, at 242-44; Chou, supra note 271, at 229-30.  See Joseph Y.S. 
Cheng, Democratization in Hong Kong: A Theoretical Exception, in DEMOCRACY IN 
EASTERN ASIA: ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES IN A REGION OF DIVERSITY 224, 229-
30 (Edmund S.K. Fung & Steve Drakeley eds., 2014) (describing pro-Beijing and pro-
democracy parties). 
282 Chen, supra note 115, at 244-5; Lam, supra note 115, at 141-2; Ho-fung Hung & Iam-
chong Ip, Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement and the Making of China’s Offshore Civil 
Society, 52 ASIAN SURVEY 504, 508-11 (2012); Zheng Yongnian & Tok Sow Keat, Beijing 
Responds to Hong Kong’s Democratization Movement: From Bureaucratic Control to 
Political Leadership, 33 ASIAN AFFAIRS 235, 244-5 (2007).  See MINERS, supra note 271, 
at 196-202 (detailing a historical perspective on the evolution of new political parties in 
Hong Kong). 
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profession or industry.283  To say that the two camps dislike each 
other would be a massive understatement, with the “pan-democrats” 
typically voting against government policies, 284  and attempted 
compromise with the government by the more moderate faction of 
the “pan-democrats” has typically been met with derision by other 
“pan-democrats.285  
 
There are two further complications that aggravate the 
uncertainty in the legislative process.  First, there is an underlying 
fissure between politicians who are pro-grassroots and those who 
are pro-business. 286   These differences have largely been 
overshadowed by the more ideologically charged issue of China and 
liberal democracy, but they remain a potential issue for major 
economic policies that involve a substantial wealth-redistribution 
element. 287   The second complication relates to the functional 
constituencies in the LegCo.  Given the narrowly defined electoral 
base, it is unsurprising that these functional constituencies of 
LegCo’s members are more concerned with appealing to their 
constituents’ interests than the overall performance of the 
government.288  
 
With this combination of formal institutional design and 
actual political competition, it is no surprise that the “Executive has 
to conduct ‘government by perpetual intensive lobbying, horse-
                                                
283 Chen, supra note 115, at 243; Lam, supra note 115, at 141-2.  Cf., Cheng, supra note 
281, at 243 (observing that the popular support for pro-democracy groups is to further 
“checks and balances against the soft authoritarianism of the HKSAR government” rather 
than the notion of “pro-democracy movement would provide a credible alternative 
government”, or even “a more effective and efficient administration.”).  See Chou, supra 
note 271, at 230-3. 
284 Hung & Ip, supra note 282, at 513; Lam, supra note 115, at 145.  See Cheng, supra note 
281, at 241-2 (discussing the recent rise of radical political actions in Hong Kong). 
285 Chen, supra note 115, at 241-2.  See Yongnian & Keat, supra note 282, at 246-7 
(discussing the culture war style labels employed during the 2004 public debate on 
constitutional reforms). 
286 Chen, supra note 115, at 244; Chou, supra note 271, at 231-2; Lam, supra note 115, at 
138. 
287 See, e.g., LEE, ET AL., supra note 88, at 74-5 (discussing the political dynamic over the 
anti-poverty campaign); see, e.g., Chou, supra note 271, at 241 (discussing how the 
enactment of the minimum wage represents a rare departure of the interest of the otherwise 
dominant business class). 
288 Chen, supra note 115, at 232-33; Lam, supra note 115, at 144-5.  Chou, supra note 271, 
at 230-1 (comparing the geographical districts that comprises of 3.37 million voters, the 
functional constituencies that made up half the Legislative Council are voted by a mere 
two hundred thousand odd voters.). 
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trading and playing one political party or grouping off another’”289 
and yet still face significant obstacles in obtaining LegCo approval 
of controversial legislation and appropriations for major 
infrastructure projects.290  All of these factors certainly help explain 
the delay in the legislative approval of the BSD.  The amendment 
bill continued to languish at the legislative-approval stage more than 
a year after the policy announcement.  As examined above in Part 
III.C, one major cause of the delay was a filibuster by the more 
radical “pan-democrats” to derail general legislative activities.  
Similarly, there was intense lobbying by the functional group of 
legislators representing the real estate and construction sectors to—
not surprisingly—repeal or otherwise dilute the tax that negatively 
impacts the attractiveness of Hong Kong real estate.  Furthermore, 
the pro-grassroots politicians were also busy working to appeal to 
the populist sentiment against foreigners (in particular mainlanders) 
by proposing amendments that further extended the reach of the 
BSD. The controversy over the “oral undertaking” only highlights 
the intense hostility among the political parties and the 
consequential legislative uncertainty.  
3. The Problematic Failed Legislation by Press Release 
Such delay and uncertainty in securing legislative approval 
to give retrospective effect to the legal measures previously 
announced are certainly not conducive to providing information to 
private entities who are desperately seeking guidance on the legal 
consequences of their intended actions.  Indeed, this uncertainty 
negates the main advantage of legislation by press release—namely, 
the retrospective effect would not unduly unravel the rational and 
legitimate expectation of private entities in light of the advance 
warning via the announcement.  When private entities cannot rely 
on the legislature adhering to or even effecting the change proposed 
in the initial announcement, they are stuck in a quandary of either 
proceeding on the basis of the proposed new law that may never 
pass, or acting in accordance with the existing law but risk being 
subjected to the proposed new law if it is ultimately passed.  This 
situation renders the reference to the previous use of legislation by 
                                                
289 Chen, supra note 115, at 230.  
290 Chen, supra note 115, at 230; Chou, supra note 271, at 241. See Lam, supra note 115, 
at 142-4 (evaluating the performance of the Legislative Council through assessing stats on 
voting behavior and legislation success rate). 
58 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    Vol. 10 
 
press release by the current government291 ill-conceived because the 
political dynamic has been dramatically altered.   
 
Of course, the more interesting issue is the future use of 
legislation by press release beyond the BSD.  One likelihood is that 
the use of legislation by press release will fade away in Hong Kong. 
Frequent refusals of the legislature to advance the executive’s policy 
objectives weaken the power and influence of the executive 
branch.292  This dynamic aggravates efforts to use legislation by 
press release because it directly undermines the executive’s 
credibility.  Having encountered such difficulties over 
implementation of the BSD (and also the SSD and DSD), the 
executive will arguably be hesitant to utilize such measures in the 
future.  Indeed, it is not surprising that the U.S., given its formal 
separation of powers and divided political scene, is conspicuously 
absent in Charles Sampford’s survey of legislation by press 
release. 293   Such a development is actually welcome because, 
notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the use of legislation 
by press release, poorly executed legislation by press release is 
clearly undesirable and should be avoided. 
 
However, there is another, more disturbing possibility.  As 
observed in Part IV.B.1, the BSD is a departure from previous uses 
of legislation by press release in Hong Kong in that the policy 
objective is economic regulation rather than the more typical 
objectives of revenue generation or tax avoidance.  Moreover, the 
case study of the BSD demonstrates how the initial announcement, 
despite any legal authorization, has already produced a dramatic 
impact on people’s behavior that is consistent with the policy 
objective of cooling the property market and reducing demand by 
foreign buyers.  Thus, even if the BSD had been ultimately rejected 
by the LegCo, the executive has successfully managed to achieve its 
                                                
291 See, e.g., LC Paper No. CB(1) 2399/10-11, supra note 245 (discussing the 1987 and 
1992 amendments to the Inland Revenue Ordinance, which were passed with retrospective 
effect). 
292 Chou, supra note 271 (“Whether Legco passes its bills, is of major concern to the 
government. The defeat of important bills may be regarded as a no-confidence vote on the 
government.”). 
293 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 156-64.  In contrast, numerous U.S. examples are discussed 
with respect to retrospective criminal law and retrospective taxation laws, see SAMPFORD, 
supra note 2, at 132-41 & 154-6. 
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policy objective, at least for the considerable period of over a 
year.294  
 
The fact that the executive may still achieve some of its 
policy objectives despite the ultimate rejection by the legislature 
means that legislation by press release remains a potent tool for the 
executive.  This tool is of limited use when revenue is the objective 
because the government will not be able to collect the revenue until 
the legislation is passed.  However, when the objective is to alter the 
behaviors and actions of private entities, those behaviors and actions 
will be affected from the date of announcement.  Of course, 
repeated failures to secure the legislature’s “ratification” of the 
legislation by press release will introduce uncertainty among private 
entities.  This situation will dilute the impact, but is unlikely to 
negate the influence, of the executive announcement on private 
entities.  In particular, given that the legal advice in the 
circumstance of uncertain legislation by press release will be a 
conservative one that makes provision for the proposed laws,295 the 
announcement’s impact will be substantial for substantial economic 
activities that typically involve lawyers.  Thus, unless it is 
abundantly clear that the executive has become a lame duck for 
political or legal reasons, the executive will have the incentive to 
rely on legislation by press release to out-maneuver an 
obstructionist LegCo, notwithstanding the aggravated concerns over 
uncertainty and separation of powers. 
 
                                                
294 See Carbonara et al., supra note 253, at 293-5 (analyzing how the social reaction trigged 
by the announcement of pending legal changes can affect the final receptivity of the law); 
Joonmo Cho & Iljoong Kim, An Economic Analysis of Takings in Korea: Endogenous 
Probability and Announcement Effects, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 331, 343-44 (2002) 
(utilizing the case study of a government eminent domain exercise in Korea to discuss how 
the government may utilize the resulting drop in property value caused by an 
announcement of proposed exercise of eminent domain to achieve its policy and political 
objectives even if the proposed exercise is ultimately cancelled). 
295 See supra Part III.D.  This is also why lawyers have been insisting that the purchaser 
deposit the BSD right at the transaction even though the BSD is only due thirty days after 
the legislation have passed.  There will be an interesting nuances based on whether the 
legislation in question is a benefit or a burden.  If it is a benefit (e.g., a subsidy for certain 
activities), there is less concern about “defensive” lawyering that would otherwise give de 
facto effect to a law imposing a burden (e.g., tax) notwithstanding uncertainty as to 
eventual passage.  However, there would more political pressure on the legislature to give 
effect to a benefit, resulting in a corresponding increase, in the likelihood of legislative 
passage.  
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VI. THE INCONSISTENT HARM OF RETROSPECTIVITY 
Beyond the practice of legislation by press release, this case 
study also provides a useful reexamination of the conventional 
understanding of retrospective laws.  Echoing the existing literature 
on legislation by press release, the retrospective effect of the 
legislative amendment implementing the BSD did not upset the 
reliance interests of private individuals.  The legislative amendment 
was backdated to the public announcement by the government that 
included a relatively detailed exposition of the mechanics of the 
BSD and received extensive press coverage.296  Potential property 
purchasers and sellers would also have been amply advised by their 
property agents and lawyers on the pending BSD.  In this regard, it 
is especially noteworthy that, with the implementation date of the 
BSD being the day after the policy announcement, the BSD was 
essentially prospectively implemented vis-à-vis the public 
announcement.  If the objections to retrospective laws are primarily 
based on private individuals being blindsided by the subsequent 
alterations of the legal consequences of their past actions, then they 
are clearly not applicable to the otherwise retrospective BSD. 
  
Nevertheless, many academics have correctly noted that 
formally prospective laws can nevertheless upset the reliance 
interests of private individuals.297  When the activity implicated by a 
prospective law involves a long time horizon or substantial prior 
preparatory work, planning by private individuals can still be 
detrimentally affected by prospective changes of laws taking effect 
during the continuous duration of the activity or after substantial 
preparatory work has been undertaken.298  In this regard, given the 
lengthy duration involved in the search and purchase of a real 
estate—a non-trivial transaction for most private entities—there 
would still be major disruptions to private actions even if the initial 
announcement of the BSD were actually accompanied by effective 
prospective legislation.  Private individuals who had commenced 
                                                
296 See supra Part III.B. 
297 E.g., SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 24-5 (providing examples of facially prospective laws 
with retrospective effect); Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 221-2 (discussing how 
prospective legislation can change future consequences of past events); Prebble et al., 
supra note 3, at 25-8 (illustrating situations where a change in law affects pre-existing 
rights and expectations).  See also Salembier, supra note 3, at 116-8 (arguing for the 
separate conceptual category of vested rights to deal with such situations). 
298 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 24-5; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 221-2. 
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the process of finding a suitable property for purchase or who were 
already in the process of negotiating the property price might have 
had to restart the entire process on account of the hefty new taxes 
thwarting their original financial planning.      
 
This insight about the irrelevance of whether the law is 
formally retrospective has been well established in the U.S. legal 
literature on “legal transition,” a discourse that incorporates 
economic perspectives to examine the broader issue of how changes 
in legal rules affect the behavior of private entities.  Since the major 
pioneering works of Michael J. Graetz299 and Louis Kaplow,300 the 
concept has enjoyed such wide acceptance and application that a 
U.S. commenter observed, “[m]odern scholarship generally supports 
the indulgence toward statutory retroactivity, arguing that all 
changes in legal rules, whether nominally retrospective or 
prospective, defeat expectations based on the prior state of the 
law.”301  However, such discourse remains conspicuously absent in 
many other jurisdictions where formal retrospectivity is still capable 
of inciting public and political agitation and invites special judicial 
scrutiny not available to formally prospective laws that may 
otherwise have severe retrospective consequences.302  Indeed, the 
strong objection of a Hong Kong LegCo member (Margaret Ng) to 
the prior 2010 legislation by press release implementing the SSD303 
is instructive on misguided criticism based on retrospectivity.  The 
retrospectivity of the amendments is the central theme of her 
criticism, but many of the harms she identifies are neither related to 
retrospectivity (e.g., unfairness arising from the substance of the 
SSD), 304  nor applicable in light of the notice given by the 
                                                
299 See Graetz, supra note 28 (discussing the impact of the effective dates of changes in 
income tax laws). 
300 See Kaplow, supra note 28 (evaluating various legal transition policies using economic 
analysis). 
301 Woolhandler, supra note 64, at 1016, 1022-3. For examples of the application of legal 
transitions, see, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 64 (presenting a transition policy framework for 
making normative judgments); Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The 
Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 394-5 (2010) 
(addressing why there is no insurance market for legal transitions and identifying the best 
institutional structure for proper transition relief). 
302 See supra Part II.A & II.B. 
303 Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 12365, 12561-64 (June 22, 2011) 
(H.K.). 
304 The highlighted problems relating to the uncertainty surrounding the definition of 
“acquired” and “disposed of” or unfairness due to the lack of exemption for transactions 
between close relatives remained in the final version of the bill that was ultimately passed, 
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government (e.g., the guidance of the law).305  This is not to say that 
the SSD is above criticism but simply that retrospectivity is not at 
issue despite its attractiveness as a rhetorical tool.  
 
In this regard, Charles Sampford appropriately critiques the 
blanket aversion towards retrospective laws while advocating for a 
contextual analysis that focuses on the affected expectations of the 
private individuals.306  Indeed, if protection of expectations is the 
rationale, then Sampford and others are correct to highlight that the 
key issue is whether the expectation is indeed rational and 
legitimate, 307  with the implication that retrospective laws that 
counteract irrational or illegitimate expectations (e.g., laws targeting 
tax evasion by exploiting unintended legislative loopholes)308 or that 
seek to protect rational and legitimate expectations (e.g., curative 
legislation to restore previous widespread, reasonable understanding 
that is subsequently judicially adjudicated to be wrong), are 
consistent and justified under the reliance reasoning.309 
 
Moreover, the analysis of retrospective laws must be 
sensitive toward the underlying political infrastructure of the 
jurisdiction.  The concerns about retrospectivity, in particular, and 
legal transition, in general, are premised on both the existence and 
the desirability of a stable legal regime.310  This situation might 
arguably be true for stable democracies that have not witnessed any 
major changes to their governing institutions for a considerable 
                                                                                                           
and would not be remedied by the removal of retrospectivity.  Cf. Official Record of 
Proceedings, Legislative Council, 12365, 12562-63; (June 22, 2011) (H.K.); Stamp Duty 
Ordinance, (2013) Cap. 117, § 29CA (H.K.). 
305 Official Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, 12365, 12561-2 (June 22, 2011) 
(H.K.). 
306 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 247-56.  See also GOLDING, supra note 5, at 247-22 
(discussing the criteria of whether reasonable expectations are unfairly frustrated that was 
advanced by Lon L. Fuller). 
307 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 88-95; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1085-6.  See Påhlsson, supra 
note 8, at 273 (noting EU jurisprudence that seeks to protect legitimate expectations).  See 
also GOLDING, supra note 5, at 246-7 (observing how the passage of time may affect the 
analysis–where individuals may have reasonable expectations about the continuation of 
laws that are otherwise promulgated by a dubious regime and morally suspect if that 
dubious regime enjoys considerable longevity). 
308 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 147-51 (discussing Australian retrospective laws against 
blatant tax evasion). 
309 Id., at 104-18 (discussing the various sub-categories of curative legislation). 
310 C.f. Fisch, supra note 3, at 1105-8 (observing how the conventional fairness arguments–
as opposed to the efficiency arguments that favors retrospectivity–are most applicable in 
the situation where the law/regulation is in a stable equilibrium). 
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period, such as the U.K. and the U.S.  However, this state of affairs 
is certainly not common around the globe, where ongoing political 
and democratic transitions remain the current norm.  In Hong Kong, 
for example, vigorous public debate and political maneuvering have 
been ongoing with respect to constitutional reforms to transition the 
current “partial democracy” 311  into one in which the Chief 
Executive and LegCo are truly democratically elected by universal 
suffrage.312 
 
Where a jurisdiction is undergoing substantial changes in the 
very foundation of its constitutional structure, both of the premises 
that underpin the objections towards retrospectivity are absent.  The 
existence of a stable legal regime is by definition absent during 
institutional transition.  The desirability of stability is also 
questionable in a context where the shortcomings of the prior 
regime typically serve as the impetus for change.  Martin P. Golding 
argued that retrospective legislation may be “the best way of dealing 
with a messy situation” arising from the transition of a despotic 
regime to a democratic government given the need to express moral 
judgment of the past.313  Indeed, even in the context of stable 
democracies, there may be selected areas where legal changes are 
frequent at certain times such that retrospectivity is desirable314 or 
where retrospective laws are necessary to remedy the underlying 
regime suffering from systemic deficiencies in need of change.315 
 
Thus, this case study of legislation by press release reaffirms 
the fallacy of adopting a special approach when dealing with formal 
retrospectivity.  A proper appreciation of the rationales against 
retrospectivity reveals that the importance of protecting the reliance 
interests of private individuals is neither universal among, nor 
unique to, formally retrospective laws.  It is more fruitful to be 
sensitive to the expectations that will be altered under any laws and 
to appreciate that there will be many instances in which the 
alteration of such expectations, whether by retrospective or 
                                                
311 Chou, supra note 271, at 228; Lam, supra note 115, at 137. 
312 Albert H.Y. Chen, Hong Kong’s Constitutional Moment of 2014, 43 H.K. L. J. 791, 791-
2 (2013); Cheng, supra note 281, at 242. 
313 GOLDING, supra note 5, at 258-61. 
314 Fisch, supra note 3, at 1108-11. 
315 See, e.g., SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 147-51 (discussing rampant tax avoidance in 
Australia during the 1970s due to a combination of legal and political factors). 
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prospective laws, will be normatively justified.  These 
considerations are especially important for regimes undergoing 
transition, where there is likely to be a greater scope of 
circumstances in which retrospective laws are normatively justified. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The implementation of the BSD provides an illustrative case 
study to critically reexamine legislation by press release in 
particular and retrospective laws in general.  The prospective 
announcement of pending retrospective changes to law not only 
enhances the legality of legislation by press but also defuses the 
objections to retrospective laws that are premised on protecting the 
reliance interests of private individuals.  Notwithstanding qualms 
about the increased use of this mechanism to effect speedy legal 
changes, legislation by press release may be normatively justified—
but only after circumspect examination of whether the use is really 
necessary to prevent circumvention of policy objectives and 
whether the underlying political dynamic will aggravate the harm of 
uncertainty and the executive’s usurpation of legislative powers.  
On a broader note, legislation by press release confirms that the 
conventional aversion towards retrospective laws can misleadingly 
distract from the crux issue of legal transition in both retrospective 
and prospective laws.  
 
The awareness of these issues is critical.  Given the general 
legality of both legislation by press release and retrospective law 
under the current laws of most jurisdictions, a well-informed public 
discourse and political process are ultimately the best check to 
ensure that the usage of the practice is confined to situations in 
which it is truly warranted.  After all, the use of legislation by press 
release—to effect potentially far-reaching economic regulation no 
less—is not going away anytime soon. 
  
 
 
